PH budget transparency, 64; Congress budget oversight, 36

THE PHILIPPINES scored 64, on a scale of 0 to 100, for transparency of eight budget documents in the latest Open Budget Survey (OBS) 2015, a global survey of 102 countries in the world.

This piece of good news comes, however, with findings of weakness in budget oversight by the Philippine Congress, which got a dismal 36 points.

Yet still, budget oversight by the Commission on Audit got a 92-point score, while public participation, 67, one of the highest in the world.

The new Philippine rating, for transparency of budget documents, a 16-point growth from 48 in 2012, puts the country in the top tier of 24 nations that provide substantial budget information to citizens.

The only independent, comparative, and regular measure of global budget transparency and accountability conducted every two years by independent civil society researchers, the OBS is a project of the International Budget Partnership (IBP) based in Washington, DC.

The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) has served as country researcher for the OBS since 2008. Karol Ilagan and Charmaine P. Lirio of PCIJ did research for the Philippines for OBS 2015.

The OBS does not reflect opinion but measures observable facts using 140 indicators, according to a standard research methodology.

OBS 2015 Is the fifth to be released by IBP since 2006. It now covers 102 countries that are home to about 90 percent of the world’s population.

Not an opinion poll

The OBS uses documented evidence and objective criteria “to evaluate the extent to which national or central governments in 102 countries provide the public with timely and comprehensive access to eight key budget documents required by international good practices.”

The OBS also examines “the ability of legislatures and supreme audit institutions to provide effective oversight of government budgets and opportunities for the public to participate in the budget process.”

The OBS is not an opinion poll or a measure of perceptions. It is based instead on a rigorous, objective methodology subject to independent review.

Researchers were trained in the OBS methodology and required to test budget transparency in practice, visit with government offices to check compliance with publication deadlines, and interview key informants.

Documented evidence, including citation of a law, interview, a copy of a document, were required to back up the researchers’ answers to the questionnaire.

The completed 140-item questionnaires were checked by anonymous, independent reviewers. Government officials were offered an opportunity to comment on the questionnaire for their country. The IBP staff referee any disagreement between reviewers and researchers to arrive at the most appropriate answer for the questions.

What it is, isn’t

A subset of 109 questions from the 140-question OBS is used to construct the Open Budget Index (OBI) that determines a hard score, ranging from 0 to 100, on budget transparency for each country assessed. The Philippines’s score of 64 for budget transparency comes from the OBI.

Meanwhile, the extent of public participation in the budget process was measured in 16 questions, and the strength of oversight institutions, in 15 questions.

The OBI assigns a transparency score on a 100-point scale using 109 of the 140 survey questions, which focuses specifically on whether the government provides the public with timely access to comprehensive information contained in the eight key budget documents.

The OBS, however, “does not directly measure the accuracy of information contained in budget reports — whether the information provided is correct — or the degree to which government budgets are equitable and address the needs of their populace.”

Too, the OBS “does not measure corruption” but only “budget transparency, opportunities for the public to participate, and oversight capability.”

The link exists, however, according to IBP. “If corruption is to be tackled, governments will need to take many different measures. It is critical that governments tackle corruption and as a first step, increase budget transparency and thereby close one door through which corruption can occur.”


THE PHILIPPINES: Top in ASEAN

The Philippines’s score of 64 in the OBI puts it on top of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations with its score of 64 for transparency of budget documents.

In the last eight years, the Philippines’ OBI score has shifted up and down, however. It scored 51 in 2006, 48 in 2008, 55 in 2010, 48 in 2012, and finally 64 in the latest report.

Public participation in the budget process got a 67 point grade, which is higher than the global average of 25,

Specific elements of public participation in the country was defined thus — Executive Branch – Adequate; Legislature – Limited; and Audit – Limited.

The sorriest point in the Philippines’s performance is budget oversight by Congress that got a dismal 36 points grade.

This poor score derives form following findings:

* “The legislature provides limited oversight during the planning stage of the budget cycle and weak oversight during the implementation stage of the budget cycle.”

* “A pre-budget debate by the legislature does not take place, and regular consultations on budget matters between the executive and the legislature do not take place. ”

* “In both law and practice, the legislature is not consulted prior to the virement of funds in the Enacted Budget and spending contingency funds that were not identified in the Enacted Budget.”

In contrast, budget oversight by the supreme audit institution (Commission on Audit) scored a fantastic 92 points. This derives from the following factors:

* “The supreme audit institution provides adequate budget oversight. Under the law, it has full discretion to undertake audits as it sees fit.”

* “The head of the supreme audit institution cannot be removed without legislative or judicial approval, which bolsters its independence.”

* “The supreme audit institution is provided with sufficient resources to fulfill its mandate and has a limited quality assurance system in place.”

Recommendations

The OBS 2015 report raised the following recommendations for the Philippines:

On Improving Transparency

* Increase the comprehensiveness of the Executive’s Budget Proposal by, for example, presenting expenditures for a multi-year period by the three expenditure classifications and by program and presenting more information on issues beyond the core budget.

* Increase the comprehensiveness of the Year-End Report.

On Improving Public Participation

* Provide detailed feedback on how public perspectives have been captured and taken into account.

* Hold legislative hearings to review and scrutinize Audit Reports.

* Provide detailed feedback on how public assistance and participation has been used by the supreme audit institution.

On Improving Budget Oversight:

* Ensure the legislature holds a pre-budget debate and the outcome is reflected in the Enacted Budget.

* Establish regular consultations on budget matters between the executive and the legislature.

* In both law and practice, ensure the legislature is consulted prior to the disbursement of funds in the Enacted Budget and the spending of contingency funds that were not identified in the Enacted Budget.

GLOBAL FINDINGS

Efficient, effective, and accountable budget systems stand on three pillars: budget transparency, citizen engagement in the budget process, and formal oversight institutions. The absence of any one of these three components undermines the entire system, IBP said.

In OBS 2015, “only four of the 102 countries assessed — Brazil, Norway, South Africa, and the United States — have brought the three elements of their fiscal accountability ecosystem in line with international best practice.

New Zealand and Sweden were ranked No. 1 and No. 2 though in the OBI, or for transparency of budget documents.

But a large majority of the countries assessed – in which 68 percent of the world’s population lives – provide insufficient budget information. These 78 countries have OBI scores of 60 or less.

Worse still, “a troubling 17 countries provide scant or no budget information, with scores of 20 or less.”

According to IBP, “the prevalence of weak budget accountability ecosystems ultimately threatens national development outcomes and the success of global initiatives like the Sustainable Development Goals and agreements pending on addressing climate change.”

Additionally, “the 24 countries providing sufficient budget information tend to have higher levels of income, a freer press, and stronger democratic systems than the countries that provide insufficient budget information. Interestingly, more transparent countries are also typically perceived to be less corrupt.”

One surprising finding though is this: “Any country – irrespective of geographical location or income level – can establish open and accountable budget systems if the political will exists to do so.”

Interestingly, “the weakest performing countries (those with scores of 40 or below) actually have higher incomes, on average, than the countries with scores between 41 and 60.” This, IBP said, “likely reflects the many hydrocarbon revenue-dependent countries with very low levels of budget transparency,” with the exception of Mexico, Malawi, and Uganda.

A far larger number of countries (32) fail to meet the Survey’s standard of adequacy on any of the measures.

Bolivia, Cambodia, Chad, China, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Iraq, Myanmar, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam have been among the least transparent countries (with OBI scores of 20 or less) every single year they have been in the Survey.

Of the 25 countries whose scores placed them in the limited category when first surveyed (with OBI scores between 41 and 60), 19 either remain there or have fallen into lower categories in 2015.

HOW NATIONS FARE

TOP CLUSTER: On a scale of 0 to 100 in the OBI, the following countries landed in the top category – with scores of 88 to 62, in descending order:

New Zealand Sweden South Africa Norway United States, Brazil, France, United Kingdom, Romania, Peru, Russia, Italy, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Georgia, Mexico, Bulgaria, South Korea, Malawi, Portugal, Poland, Philippines, and Uganda

MIDDLE CLUSTER: On a scale of 0 to 100 in the OBI, the following countries landed in the top category – with scores of 41 to 59, in descending order:

Argentina, Indonesia, Spain, Chile, Colombia, Slovakia, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, Mongolia, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Hungary, Kenya, Serbia, Botswana, Mali, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Namibia, India, Tanzania, Malaysia, Ukraine, Benin, Turkey, Cameroon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Pakistan, Honduras, Thailand, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Timor-Leste

BOTTOM CLUSTER: On a scale of 0 to 100 in the OBI, the following countries landed in the top category – with scores of 0 to 39, in descending order:

Dem. Rep. of Congo, Sri Lanka, Zambia, Mozambique, Albania, Morocco, Liberia, Rwanda, Macedonia, Zimbabwe, Trinidad and Tobago, Yemen, São Tomé e Príncipe, Angola, Tajikistan, Nepal, Nigeria, Algeria, Vietnam, Bolivia, Niger, Egypt, Fiji, China, Sudan, Venezuela, Cambodia, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Iraq, Lebanon, Myanmar, Qatar, Saudi Arabia

For further Information, visit www.openbudgetsurvey.org

PH budget transparency, 64; Congress budget oversight, 36

THE PHILIPPINES scored 64, on a scale of 0 to 100, for transparency of eight budget documents in the latest Open Budget Survey (OBS) 2015, a global survey of 102 countries in the world.

This piece of good news comes, however, with findings of weakness in budget oversight by the Philippine Congress, which got a dismal 36 points.

Yet still, budget oversight by the Commission on Audit got a 92-point score, while public participation, 67, one of the highest in the world.

The new Philippine rating, for transparency of budget documents, a 16-point growth from 48 in 2012, puts the country in the top tier of 24 nations that provide substantial budget information to citizens.

The only independent, comparative, and regular measure of global budget transparency and accountability conducted every two years by independent civil society researchers, the OBS is a project of the International Budget Partnership (IBP) based in Washington, DC.

The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) has served as country researcher for the OBS since 2008. Karol Ilagan and Charmaine P. Lirio of PCIJ did research for the Philippines for OBS 2015.

The OBS does not reflect opinion but measures observable facts using 140 indicators, according to a standard research methodology.

OBS 2015 Is the fifth to be released by IBP since 2006. It now covers 102 countries that are home to about 90 percent of the world’s population.

Not an opinion poll

The OBS uses documented evidence and objective criteria “to evaluate the extent to which national or central governments in 102 countries provide the public with timely and comprehensive access to eight key budget documents required by international good practices.”

The OBS also examines “the ability of legislatures and supreme audit institutions to provide effective oversight of government budgets and opportunities for the public to participate in the budget process.”

The OBS is not an opinion poll or a measure of perceptions. It is based instead on a rigorous, objective methodology subject to independent review.

Researchers were trained in the OBS methodology and required to test budget transparency in practice, visit with government offices to check compliance with publication deadlines, and interview key informants.

Documented evidence, including citation of a law, interview, a copy of a document, were required to back up the researchers’ answers to the questionnaire.

The completed 140-item questionnaires were checked by anonymous, independent reviewers. Government officials were offered an opportunity to comment on the questionnaire for their country. The IBP staff referee any disagreement between reviewers and researchers to arrive at the most appropriate answer for the questions.

What it is, isn’t

A subset of 109 questions from the 140-question OBS is used to construct the Open Budget Index (OBI) that determines a hard score, ranging from 0 to 100, on budget transparency for each country assessed. The Philippines’s score of 64 for budget transparency comes from the OBI.

Meanwhile, the extent of public participation in the budget process was measured in 16 questions, and the strength of oversight institutions, in 15 questions.

The OBI assigns a transparency score on a 100-point scale using 109 of the 140 survey questions, which focuses specifically on whether the government provides the public with timely access to comprehensive information contained in the eight key budget documents.

The OBS, however, “does not directly measure the accuracy of information contained in budget reports — whether the information provided is correct — or the degree to which government budgets are equitable and address the needs of their populace.”

Too, the OBS “does not measure corruption” but only “budget transparency, opportunities for the public to participate, and oversight capability.”

The link exists, however, according to IBP. “If corruption is to be tackled, governments will need to take many different measures. It is critical that governments tackle corruption and as a first step, increase budget transparency and thereby close one door through which corruption can occur.”


THE PHILIPPINES: Top in ASEAN

The Philippines’s score of 64 in the OBI puts it on top of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations with its score of 64 for transparency of budget documents.

In the last eight years, the Philippines’ OBI score has shifted up and down, however. It scored 51 in 2006, 48 in 2008, 55 in 2010, 48 in 2012, and finally 64 in the latest report.

Public participation in the budget process got a 67 point grade, which is higher than the global average of 25,

Specific elements of public participation in the country was defined thus — Executive Branch – Adequate; Legislature – Limited; and Audit – Limited.

The sorriest point in the Philippines’s performance is budget oversight by Congress that got a dismal 36 points grade.

This poor score derives form following findings:

* “The legislature provides limited oversight during the planning stage of the budget cycle and weak oversight during the implementation stage of the budget cycle.”

* “A pre-budget debate by the legislature does not take place, and regular consultations on budget matters between the executive and the legislature do not take place. ”

* “In both law and practice, the legislature is not consulted prior to the virement of funds in the Enacted Budget and spending contingency funds that were not identified in the Enacted Budget.”

In contrast, budget oversight by the supreme audit institution (Commission on Audit) scored a fantastic 92 points. This derives from the following factors:

* “The supreme audit institution provides adequate budget oversight. Under the law, it has full discretion to undertake audits as it sees fit.”

* “The head of the supreme audit institution cannot be removed without legislative or judicial approval, which bolsters its independence.”

* “The supreme audit institution is provided with sufficient resources to fulfill its mandate and has a limited quality assurance system in place.”

Recommendations

The OBS 2015 report raised the following recommendations for the Philippines:

On Improving Transparency

* Increase the comprehensiveness of the Executive’s Budget Proposal by, for example, presenting expenditures for a multi-year period by the three expenditure classifications and by program and presenting more information on issues beyond the core budget.

* Increase the comprehensiveness of the Year-End Report.

On Improving Public Participation

* Provide detailed feedback on how public perspectives have been captured and taken into account.

* Hold legislative hearings to review and scrutinize Audit Reports.

* Provide detailed feedback on how public assistance and participation has been used by the supreme audit institution.

On Improving Budget Oversight:

* Ensure the legislature holds a pre-budget debate and the outcome is reflected in the Enacted Budget.

* Establish regular consultations on budget matters between the executive and the legislature.

* In both law and practice, ensure the legislature is consulted prior to the disbursement of funds in the Enacted Budget and the spending of contingency funds that were not identified in the Enacted Budget.

GLOBAL FINDINGS

Efficient, effective, and accountable budget systems stand on three pillars: budget transparency, citizen engagement in the budget process, and formal oversight institutions. The absence of any one of these three components undermines the entire system, IBP said.

In OBS 2015, “only four of the 102 countries assessed — Brazil, Norway, South Africa, and the United States — have brought the three elements of their fiscal accountability ecosystem in line with international best practice.

New Zealand and Sweden were ranked No. 1 and No. 2 though in the OBI, or for transparency of budget documents.

But a large majority of the countries assessed – in which 68 percent of the world’s population lives – provide insufficient budget information. These 78 countries have OBI scores of 60 or less.

Worse still, “a troubling 17 countries provide scant or no budget information, with scores of 20 or less.”

According to IBP, “the prevalence of weak budget accountability ecosystems ultimately threatens national development outcomes and the success of global initiatives like the Sustainable Development Goals and agreements pending on addressing climate change.”

Additionally, “the 24 countries providing sufficient budget information tend to have higher levels of income, a freer press, and stronger democratic systems than the countries that provide insufficient budget information. Interestingly, more transparent countries are also typically perceived to be less corrupt.”

One surprising finding though is this: “Any country – irrespective of geographical location or income level – can establish open and accountable budget systems if the political will exists to do so.”

Interestingly, “the weakest performing countries (those with scores of 40 or below) actually have higher incomes, on average, than the countries with scores between 41 and 60.” This, IBP said, “likely reflects the many hydrocarbon revenue-dependent countries with very low levels of budget transparency,” with the exception of Mexico, Malawi, and Uganda.

A far larger number of countries (32) fail to meet the Survey’s standard of adequacy on any of the measures.

Bolivia, Cambodia, Chad, China, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Iraq, Myanmar, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam have been among the least transparent countries (with OBI scores of 20 or less) every single year they have been in the Survey.

Of the 25 countries whose scores placed them in the limited category when first surveyed (with OBI scores between 41 and 60), 19 either remain there or have fallen into lower categories in 2015.

HOW NATIONS FARE

TOP CLUSTER: On a scale of 0 to 100 in the OBI, the following countries landed in the top category – with scores of 88 to 62, in descending order:

New Zealand Sweden South Africa Norway United States, Brazil, France, United Kingdom, Romania, Peru, Russia, Italy, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Georgia, Mexico, Bulgaria, South Korea, Malawi, Portugal, Poland, Philippines, and Uganda

MIDDLE CLUSTER: On a scale of 0 to 100 in the OBI, the following countries landed in the top category – with scores of 41 to 59, in descending order:

Argentina, Indonesia, Spain, Chile, Colombia, Slovakia, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, Mongolia, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Hungary, Kenya, Serbia, Botswana, Mali, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Namibia, India, Tanzania, Malaysia, Ukraine, Benin, Turkey, Cameroon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Pakistan, Honduras, Thailand, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Timor-Leste

BOTTOM CLUSTER: On a scale of 0 to 100 in the OBI, the following countries landed in the top category – with scores of 0 to 39, in descending order:

Dem. Rep. of Congo, Sri Lanka, Zambia, Mozambique, Albania, Morocco, Liberia, Rwanda, Macedonia, Zimbabwe, Trinidad and Tobago, Yemen, São Tomé e Príncipe, Angola, Tajikistan, Nepal, Nigeria, Algeria, Vietnam, Bolivia, Niger, Egypt, Fiji, China, Sudan, Venezuela, Cambodia, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Iraq, Lebanon, Myanmar, Qatar, Saudi Arabia

For further Information, visit www.openbudgetsurvey.org

Ombudsman on PDAF cases: Long, rough road to justice

TAKING ON corruption is never easy. After two years of investigation by nearly three dozen lawyers of the Office of the Ombudsman reviewing thousands of documents, the corruption cases involving the use of pork-barrel funds against an incredible tally of legislators are far from being concluded. Many of the cases have not even reached trial stage.

The government’s efforts to clean up the pork-barrel mess have thus far produced plunder, graft, and bribery charges against eight legislators—three senators and five members of the House of Representatives—filed before the Sandiganbayan.

The eight are among over 100 legislators who purportedly participated in the misuse and abuse of the pork barrel, otherwise known as Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).

Read: Part 8 of PCIJ’s series on “Pork a la Gloria, Pork a la PNoy”
* Ombudsman on PDAF cases: Long, rough road to justice

A third complaint that the Department of Justice filed only last August 4 against two senators and seven former and current House members is still undergoing review by the Ombudsman.

“We consider these PDAF cases as [among] the most important cases that we are prosecuting,” Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Gerard A. Mosquera tells PCIJ.

“In fact,” he adds, “a substantial number of prosecutors are involved [in these cases]. And our most senior prosecutors are directly supervising [them].”

After more than a year in court hearings, however, the Ombudsman has yet to get a conviction on the first eight cases that are now pending at the Sandiganbayan. Comments Mosquera: “Some cases proceed quickly, while others are not as quick.”

The investigation began on March 22, 2013 when the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) “rescued” Benhur Luy, from a Taguig City condominium owned by his cousin and boss, businesswoman Janet Lim Napoles. Luy would later become a whistleblower exposing massive pork-barrel fraud, pointing to Napoles as the head of a network of bogus nongovernment organizations (NGOs) that siphoned off pork-barrel funds in collusion with legislators.

Mosquera says the Ombudsman currently has 35 prosecutors exclusively focusing on the eight ongoing cases filed before the anti-graft court and five new PDAF cases. These prosecutors are apart from the scores of lawyers of the Ombudsman’s Field Investigation Office who continue to gather documentary and testimonial evidence against more potential respondents. Mosquera is serving as lead prosecutor in the cases. Mosquera heads the Ombudsman’s prosecution team.

For each of the eight cases, the Ombudsman is presenting some 5,000 documentary exhibits. The number shoots up to about 8,000 when the exhibits’ sub-markings are included. The number of witnesses who testify ranges from 30 to 50 per case.

“There is only one prosecution team for all the cases,” he says. “But on the other side, ang sa defense naman, iba-iba ang mga abugado ng mga akusado. So natural na iba-iba ang pagpapalakad nila ng depensa (But on the other side, the defense has a variety of lawyers representing the accused. Naturally, the way they carry out their defense would be different from each other).”

He can only be thankful that while the “fairly complicated” pork cases have required more than extraordinary attention on the part of the Ombudsman, these have also served as a landmark in how the regulatory and integrity agencies of government could work together to build cases against corruption.

“It’s very encouraging to share and to note,” Mosequera tells PCIJ, “for probably the first time in our history as a country, talagang nagtulong-tulong ang Office of the Ombudsman, Commission on Audit, National Bureau of Investigation, Anti-Money Laundering Council, Securities and Exchange Commission, and even the Civil Service Commission.” – PCIJ, August 2015

TESDA: Pork, pricey seminars, dicey docs, favored contractors

TWO PICTURES in stark contrast have been drawn about one agency: the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA).

The first, a none-too-flattering one, by the Commission on Audit (COA), which speaks of “deficiencies” by the dozen in the agency’s implementation of its massive training and scholarship programs.

The second, glowing and pretty, by President Benigno S. Aquino III, who has heaped generous praise on TESDA on many occasions, citing it as an exemplar of performance in the executive branch, in terms of the volume of scholars that it has trained in recent years.

Among other things, COA says that there have been many “deficiencies” in TESDA’s scholarship programs funded with pork monies and awarded to private training institutes, including missed number of target beneficiaries, overpricing of supplies and training courses, contracts awarded without bidding, improper selection of beneficiaries, seminar attendance sheets of doubtful integrity, and the holding of different seminars on the same day and time for the same dubious beneficiaries, but at different locations.

Read: Part 5 of our series on “Pork a la Gloria, Pork a la PNoy”:

* TESDA’s billions: Goody story turns sorry with pork

COA’s 2013 annual agency report on TESDA said such deficiencies were particularly present in its implementation of two major programs that had been expanded using lumpsum monies that had been loaded up in TESDA’s budget that year: Training for Work Scholarship Program (TWSP) and Cash-for-Training Project (C4TP).

The report also revealed what the state auditors said was “non-compliance” in the implementation of TWSP by TESDA’s partner Technical Vocational Institutions (TVIs) or partner training entities from the private sector.

For 2012 and 2013, data from COA and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) showed that TESDA received a total of P427.09 million in PDAF from legislators, including 19 who gave their pork monies to projects implemented by at least 11 apparently favored TVIs.

TWSP had been funded under TESDA’s regular budget in previous years. In 2012, TWSP was expanded, while C4TP was started as “a program funded from DSWD (Department of Social Welfare and Development) designed to focus on the potential contributions of disadvantaged youth to nation building by engaging them in gainful employment by providing relevant, high quality and efficient technical education and skills development by TESDA.”

In 2012, TESDA received additional monies from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of legislators. It also got Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) funds that year, one sum being its own DAP allocation, and another representing a big portion of the DAP assigned to the DSWD.

But it was when TESDA had expanded too fast and its budget had grown too fat that COA found major discrepancies in project implementation. This was even as COA cited that TESDA had reported good to outstanding results on its “key performance indicators” – i.e., number of scholars trained, graduated, assessed, and employed, and number of seminars conducted – in 2013.

In the end, the picture that emerges is that while TESDA has been striving to surpass the targets of its regular programs, its more generously funded training tracks have gotten caught in a web of conflicting interests – politics, commerce, and corruption – involving some TVIs favored by a number of legislators, and favored further by some TESDA officers at the central, regional, and provincial offices.

It’s an image that TESDA Director General Emmanuel Joel Villanueva obviously doesn’t cherish. Speaking with PCIJ by phone recently, he said that his problem with COA is it does not update its prior year’s reports to reflect agency action on its findings in subsequent months.

“Ang ano ko lang sa COA, every time they come out with report, they do not lift a finger to update the report and say naayos na. Hindi raw nila policy ‘yun.. (My concern with COA is, every time they come out with a report, they do not a lift a finger to update the report and say that the problem has been addressed. They say it’s not their policy),” Villanueva said

He also said that despite COA’s adverse findings on TESDA in COA’s report for 2013, “since I took over, at no time has COA issued a notice of disallowance or notice of suspension on me or TESDA.” Villanueva became TESDA chief in July 2010.

COA found at least 11 TVIs non-compliant or with deficiencies in implementing TWSP: Asian Touch International Institute Inc.; Asian Spirit Career Foundation, Inc.; Meridian International College of Business, Arts and Technology; Phil-Best Entrepreneurs; Ilaw ng Bayan Foundation, Inc.; Informatics Computer Institute Valenzuela; I-Connect Solutions Tek Bok Inc.; Matuwid na Landas Foundation, Inc.; Serbisyong Pagmamahal Foundation, Inc.; Mechatronics Technologies, Inc.; and BSC Technological Institute, Inc.

PCIJ research on these TVIs reveals that two of them had already ceased operations in 2014, after cornering multimillion-peso contracts from TESDA. Two others have clear political connections, while at least two more also appear to have links with a Napoles-like network of dubious nongovernment organizations (NGOs). One TVI meanwhile was incorporated in the same year that it snagged multimillion-peso projects with TESDA. Three others are sister-firms that share the same set of directors and owners.

Altogether, according to COA and DBM reports, there were at least 19 legislators who enabled these TVIs to secure contracts with TESDA: Representatives Mar-Len Abigail Binay, Monique Yazmin Lagdameo, Ma. Rachel Arenas, Oscar G. Malapitan, Romero Federico S. Quimbo, William Irwin C. Tieng, Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales, Sigfrido R. Tinga, Sherwin N. Tugna, Antonio C. Alvarez, Victorino Dennis M. Socrates, Arnel M. Cerafica, Cesar V. Sarmiento, Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco, and Winston Castelo. – PCIJ, August 2015

TESDA: Pork, pricey seminars, dicey docs, favored contractors

TWO PICTURES in stark contrast have been drawn about one agency: the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA).

The first, a none-too-flattering one, by the Commission on Audit (COA), which speaks of “deficiencies” by the dozen in the agency’s implementation of its massive training and scholarship programs.

The second, glowing and pretty, by President Benigno S. Aquino III, who has heaped generous praise on TESDA on many occasions, citing it as an exemplar of performance in the executive branch, in terms of the volume of scholars that it has trained in recent years.

Among other things, COA says that there have been many “deficiencies” in TESDA’s scholarship programs funded with pork monies and awarded to private training institutes, including missed number of target beneficiaries, overpricing of supplies and training courses, contracts awarded without bidding, improper selection of beneficiaries, seminar attendance sheets of doubtful integrity, and the holding of different seminars on the same day and time for the same dubious beneficiaries, but at different locations.

Read: Part 5 of our series on “Pork a la Gloria, Pork a la PNoy”:

* TESDA’s billions: Goody story turns sorry with pork

COA’s 2013 annual agency report on TESDA said such deficiencies were particularly present in its implementation of two major programs that had been expanded using lumpsum monies that had been loaded up in TESDA’s budget that year: Training for Work Scholarship Program (TWSP) and Cash-for-Training Project (C4TP).

The report also revealed what the state auditors said was “non-compliance” in the implementation of TWSP by TESDA’s partner Technical Vocational Institutions (TVIs) or partner training entities from the private sector.

For 2012 and 2013, data from COA and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) showed that TESDA received a total of P427.09 million in PDAF from legislators, including 19 who gave their pork monies to projects implemented by at least 11 apparently favored TVIs.

TWSP had been funded under TESDA’s regular budget in previous years. In 2012, TWSP was expanded, while C4TP was started as “a program funded from DSWD (Department of Social Welfare and Development) designed to focus on the potential contributions of disadvantaged youth to nation building by engaging them in gainful employment by providing relevant, high quality and efficient technical education and skills development by TESDA.”

In 2012, TESDA received additional monies from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of legislators. It also got Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) funds that year, one sum being its own DAP allocation, and another representing a big portion of the DAP assigned to the DSWD.

But it was when TESDA had expanded too fast and its budget had grown too fat that COA found major discrepancies in project implementation. This was even as COA cited that TESDA had reported good to outstanding results on its “key performance indicators” – i.e., number of scholars trained, graduated, assessed, and employed, and number of seminars conducted – in 2013.

In the end, the picture that emerges is that while TESDA has been striving to surpass the targets of its regular programs, its more generously funded training tracks have gotten caught in a web of conflicting interests – politics, commerce, and corruption – involving some TVIs favored by a number of legislators, and favored further by some TESDA officers at the central, regional, and provincial offices.

It’s an image that TESDA Director General Emmanuel Joel Villanueva obviously doesn’t cherish. Speaking with PCIJ by phone recently, he said that his problem with COA is it does not update its prior year’s reports to reflect agency action on its findings in subsequent months.

“Ang ano ko lang sa COA, every time they come out with report, they do not lift a finger to update the report and say naayos na. Hindi raw nila policy ‘yun.. (My concern with COA is, every time they come out with a report, they do not a lift a finger to update the report and say that the problem has been addressed. They say it’s not their policy),” Villanueva said

He also said that despite COA’s adverse findings on TESDA in COA’s report for 2013, “since I took over, at no time has COA issued a notice of disallowance or notice of suspension on me or TESDA.” Villanueva became TESDA chief in July 2010.

COA found at least 11 TVIs non-compliant or with deficiencies in implementing TWSP: Asian Touch International Institute Inc.; Asian Spirit Career Foundation, Inc.; Meridian International College of Business, Arts and Technology; Phil-Best Entrepreneurs; Ilaw ng Bayan Foundation, Inc.; Informatics Computer Institute Valenzuela; I-Connect Solutions Tek Bok Inc.; Matuwid na Landas Foundation, Inc.; Serbisyong Pagmamahal Foundation, Inc.; Mechatronics Technologies, Inc.; and BSC Technological Institute, Inc.

PCIJ research on these TVIs reveals that two of them had already ceased operations in 2014, after cornering multimillion-peso contracts from TESDA. Two others have clear political connections, while at least two more also appear to have links with a Napoles-like network of dubious nongovernment organizations (NGOs). One TVI meanwhile was incorporated in the same year that it snagged multimillion-peso projects with TESDA. Three others are sister-firms that share the same set of directors and owners.

Altogether, according to COA and DBM reports, there were at least 19 legislators who enabled these TVIs to secure contracts with TESDA: Representatives Mar-Len Abigail Binay, Monique Yazmin Lagdameo, Ma. Rachel Arenas, Oscar G. Malapitan, Romero Federico S. Quimbo, William Irwin C. Tieng, Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales, Sigfrido R. Tinga, Sherwin N. Tugna, Antonio C. Alvarez, Victorino Dennis M. Socrates, Arnel M. Cerafica, Cesar V. Sarmiento, Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco, and Winston Castelo. – PCIJ, August 2015