95 SOCE non-filers running again, despite ‘perpetual disqualification’

By Jake Crisologo

THEY WISH to lead the nation but refuse to comply even with the most basic rules: Report to the Commission on Elections how much money they raised and spent in their campaign for public office, one month after election day. In fact, they have mocked the rules not just once but twice, and for some, thrice, in elections past.

At least 873 candidates who ran for national and local posts from the 2007 to the 2013 elections should be banned for life from running again, according to the Commission on Elections’ Campaign Finance Office (CFO). This is because these candidates had not filed their Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) in the last three elections.

PCIJ. Non-filers by region. may 2016

Indeed, while they may contest the ruling of the CFO, for all intents and purposes, their names remain enrolled in the Comelec’s list of candidates for “perpetual disqualification.” Win or lose, the Comelec has ruled that all candidates and parties must file SOCEs.

Yet at least 95 of these seem truly incorrigible, and are running again in the May 2016 elections. They include one candidate for senator, eight for district representative, eight for governor, at least 33 for mayor, 11 for vice mayor, and 34 for councilor of various cities and towns.

Resolution No. 9991, the Omnibus Rules on Campaign Finance that Comelec issued on Oct. 2, 2015, states that on its own, the CFO “may file petitions to disqualify” a candidate, including for failure to submit his or her SOCE “in relation to at least two elections.”

In that situation, Rule 13 of Resolution No. 9991, spells out the penalty as being “perpetual disqualification to hold public office.”

Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim, head of Comelec’s CFO, concedes, though, that the delinquents may still turn to “due process” as their final recourse and contest or appeal his office’s decision.

Mostly local bets

Comelec data show that by position, the list of delinquent candidates is dominated by candidates to local positions. They make up 75 percent of the total.

At least 680 have sought seats as councilor in various Sangguniang Bayan or Municipal Council (530 candidates), Sangguniang Panglungsod or City Council (150 candidates), and Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Provincial Council (120 candidates).

Another 123 had run for vice mayor, 116 for mayor, 11 for vice governor, 19 for governor, and seven for membership in the regional assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao or ARMM.

In addition, 41 of these delinquent candidates had aspired to become members of the House of Representatives, and one, to be senator.

The total number of candidates by position at 1,100 is higher than actual number of individuals because some of the same candidates had run for different positions across election years.

A fourth from ARMM

Interestingly, by regional spread, one in four of the delinquent candidates, or 212, came from ARMM. But defiance of election law seems to be an epidemic across all the regions of the Philippines.

Other regions with delinquent candidates include: CALABARZON, 94 candidates; Davao Region, 90; Cordillera Administrative Region, 81; Central Luzon, 60; SOCCSKSARGEN, 60; National Capital Region, 59; Western Visayas, 36; Ilocos Region, 28; Cagayan Valley, 33; Central Visayas, 25; MIMAROPA, 24; Eastern Visayas, 21; Northern Mindanao, 19; Zamboanga Peninsula, 17; Bicol Region,16; and Caraga, seven.

(The delinquents from the relatively new Negros Island Region were included in the counts from Western and Central Visayas or Negros Occidental and Oriental. These two now make up Negros Island Region, which was formed only on May 19, 2015 by virtue of Executive Order No. 183.)

The count per region and per province of 882 candidates is closer to the calculated number of individuals at 873, which was derived from subtracting the number of repeated names for candidates who had run in two or more localities.

A big majority of these delinquent candidates had run as independents, or without any political party affiliation.

From parties of presidents

An interesting picture emerges for a subgroup of 131 delinquent candidates who had run for district representative, governor, and vice governor from the 2007 to the 2013 elections, including 18 candidates running again in the May 2016 elections.

In this subgroup, 87 are independents but a significant number had run as candidates of the national political parties led by the incumbent and former presidents of the country:

* Eleven of the delinquents in this subgroup ran as candidates of the Liberal Party (LP) of President Benigno S. Aquino III;

• Eight from the Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP) of ousted President Joseph Estrada that is part of the opposition United Nationalist Alliance;

• Six from the Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo;

• Seven from the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) party of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos; and

• Five from the Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD) of former President Fidel Ramos.

PCIJ. Non-filers of SOCE, By Party, may 2016

The more prominent names in the list of delinquents include erstwhile rebel leader Nur Misuari who ran for governor of Sulu province in 2007 and 2010, and again for regional governor of ARMM in 2013. In all three instances, Misuari ran as an independent candidate. And in all three instances, too, he did not file his election spending report.

Yet another is Macario Asistio Jr., who ran for vice mayor in 2010, and mayor in 2013, of Caloocan City, and on both occasions failed to submit his SOCE to the Comelec.

Still a third is Ismael ‘Chuck’ Mathay III, sole son of former long-time Quezon City Mayor Ismael Mathay Jr. Chuck Mathay ran and won as representative of Quezon City’s 2nd District in 2007 and 2010 and, like Asistio, failed to file his SOCE both times.

Running once more

From the roster of delinquent candidates come a few who have again filed their candidacies for various posts in the May 2016 elections. They include

• Kadra Asana Masihul, KBL, Sulu, who ran for provincial governor in 2013, now running for Board Member in the 1st District of Sulu;
• Albert Hans Corvera Palacios, Independent, 4th District Quezon City, who is running for the same position; he ran under the PMP banner in 2013;
• Pablo Camabrejan Villabar, KBL, Davao del Sur, running again for first district representative as an independent as in the 2013 elections;
• Amin Guintawan Sindao, independent, North Cotabato, running again for third district representative;
• Telesforo Magramo Gaan, independent candidate for governor of Romblon;
• Delfina Dorman Bicatulo, independent candidate for governor of Bukidnon;
• Ahmadjan Marogong Abdulcarim, independent candidate for governor of Lanao Del Sur;
• Justo III Hernandez Orros, independent candidate for vice governor of La Union; and
• Morsalim Alap-Polao Binnortominoray, Liberal Party candidate for vice governor of Lanao Del Sur, but independent candidate in 2013.

The lone candidate for senator, Greco Belgica, had challenged the inclusion of his name in the Comelec’s disqualification list when it first came out in December 2015. In a text message, he told the Philippine Daily Inquirer: “I filed and signed my SOCE in 2007 and 2013 so I cannot be charged for not filing my SOCE. Someone must be manipulating the records. The question is who?”

Belgica, Manila city councilor from 2004 to 2007, was a lead petitioner in a case that was filed before the Supreme Court in 2013 questioning the constitutionality of the pork-barrel system.

Weak parties

According to PulseAsia Research President Ronald Holmes, who is also a political science professor at De La Salle University, the presence of a big majority of “independent” candidates in the list of delinquents illustrates the weakness of the political party system in the country.

Notably, too, many of the candidates on the list have shifted from one to another political party across election years. This is consistent, Holmes says, with the culture of “turncoatism” or the relative ease by which politicians affiliate with different, but usually the dominant, political parties, during regime shifts.

“We don’t have substantive political parties in this country,” says Holmes. “They are basically absent. The large number of independents is not surprising and may simply mean that one does not have to be affiliated to run, and maybe even win, during the elections.”

When one considers the dynamics between politicians once they are in office, however, a different picture emerges.

At a recent public forum, Ateneo School of Government Dean Ronald Mendoza tackled political turncoatism by the candidates in regard to their quest for resources during election campaigns.

“On the local level, for example, it would be easier to engage the national government if you are allied with the current dominant party,” Mendoza said. “This can be in terms of resources, like budgets, and approvals for policies and contracts you want in your jurisdiction.”

PCIJ. Non-filers of SOCE, By Position, may 2016

No party discipline

This is not necessarily incongruous to Holmes’s assessment of the weakness of political parties during elections. Holmes even expresses little optimism when asked if political parties should or could be held responsible for policing their members who did not file their SOCEs.

“The parties themselves do not have that discipline,” he says. “Even at the national level, the dominating party is not necessarily strong or unified.”

For instance, after the May 2010 elections, “the Liberal Party was dominant but they couldn’t agree on who among them was supposed to be Senate President,” Holmes points out. “So someone not from the party took the position.”

Juan Ponce Enrile of the Nacionalista Party was elected Senate President in 2010 by a fragile coalition of political parties in the Upper Chamber.

Even the past presidents have had a history of party switching, Holmes says, adding that, “independence” is primarily a legal label than an individuality of thought or principles. Being an independent candidate, he says, simply means one was not formally nominated or affiliated with a party.

In Holmes’s book, it is highly possible that a majority of “independent” candidates on the list of delinquents may have had informal connections with the established political parties.

“They may,” he says. “This is largely determined by the dynamics on the ground and how they engage each other to achieve their goals. Take Grace Poe, for example. She’s currently independent but she may be ‘adopted’ by present political parties in the long run.”

Clans drive politics

But could, or should, delinquent candidates be allowed to run for office again?

Holmes voices concern that other than Comelec, political clans continue to drive the choice of candidates and the results of elections in many parts of the country.

“There are many powerful families and they can take control of representation mechanisms in their territories,” he observes. “The head of a political clan can determine what happens more than any external body, the Commission on Elections included.”

In areas where virulent clans with private armies rule, election officials may be hard put enforcing Comelec’s decision to disqualify delinquent candidates.

Still and all, in October 2015, when Comelec first came out with its initial list of delinquent candidates, CFO head Commissioner Lim had declared the poll body’s commitment to uphold the rule of law.

He told reporters that it was the first time Comelec had spelled out rules on the filing of petitions for disqualification of candidates who had failed to submit election spending reports to the poll body.

But because the rules provide the delinquents the opportunity to file appeals, Comelec can only collect and impose fines on such candidates until the CFO’s decision becomes final and executory.

Schedule of fines

On June 12, 2012, in Resolution No. 9476, Comelec said that for failure to file SOCEs for the first time, candidates, depending on the elective post they had run for, must pay an administrative fine ranging from P1,000 to P30,000, and for the second offense, from P2,000 to P60,000.

That could mean a tidy sum for Comelec – that is, if it does go after the delinquents to collect the fines and the candidates actually pay up.

For the 2013 elections alone, Comelec Chairman Andres Bautista had told reporters that 4,677 or about one in 10 of the candidates who ran for elective positions (net of the party-list groups) had failed to file their SOCEs, as of the deadline of July 2013. Bautista’s estimate is that the poll body could raise up to P52 million in fines from these delinquents.

But until the Comelec’s decision to perpetually bar these candidates from running for public office, becomes final and executory, there is only one, final, true judge and jury on these cases: the Filipino voter. — PCIJ, April 2016
______________________________________________
For details, check out PCIJ’s Money Politics Online

95 SOCE non-filers running again, despite ‘perpetual disqualification’

By Jake Crisologo

THEY WISH to lead the nation but refuse to comply even with the most basic rules: Report to the Commission on Elections how much money they raised and spent in their campaign for public office, one month after election day. In fact, they have mocked the rules not just once but twice, and for some, thrice, in elections past.

At least 873 candidates who ran for national and local posts from the 2007 to the 2013 elections should be banned for life from running again, according to the Commission on Elections’ Campaign Finance Office (CFO). This is because these candidates had not filed their Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) in the last three elections.

PCIJ. Non-filers by region. may 2016

Indeed, while they may contest the ruling of the CFO, for all intents and purposes, their names remain enrolled in the Comelec’s list of candidates for “perpetual disqualification.” Win or lose, the Comelec has ruled that all candidates and parties must file SOCEs.

Yet at least 95 of these seem truly incorrigible, and are running again in the May 2016 elections. They include one candidate for senator, eight for district representative, eight for governor, at least 33 for mayor, 11 for vice mayor, and 34 for councilor of various cities and towns.

Resolution No. 9991, the Omnibus Rules on Campaign Finance that Comelec issued on Oct. 2, 2015, states that on its own, the CFO “may file petitions to disqualify” a candidate, including for failure to submit his or her SOCE “in relation to at least two elections.”

In that situation, Rule 13 of Resolution No. 9991, spells out the penalty as being “perpetual disqualification to hold public office.”

Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim, head of Comelec’s CFO, concedes, though, that the delinquents may still turn to “due process” as their final recourse and contest or appeal his office’s decision.

Mostly local bets

Comelec data show that by position, the list of delinquent candidates is dominated by candidates to local positions. They make up 75 percent of the total.

At least 680 have sought seats as councilor in various Sangguniang Bayan or Municipal Council (530 candidates), Sangguniang Panglungsod or City Council (150 candidates), and Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Provincial Council (120 candidates).

Another 123 had run for vice mayor, 116 for mayor, 11 for vice governor, 19 for governor, and seven for membership in the regional assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao or ARMM.

In addition, 41 of these delinquent candidates had aspired to become members of the House of Representatives, and one, to be senator.

The total number of candidates by position at 1,100 is higher than actual number of individuals because some of the same candidates had run for different positions across election years.

A fourth from ARMM

Interestingly, by regional spread, one in four of the delinquent candidates, or 212, came from ARMM. But defiance of election law seems to be an epidemic across all the regions of the Philippines.

Other regions with delinquent candidates include: CALABARZON, 94 candidates; Davao Region, 90; Cordillera Administrative Region, 81; Central Luzon, 60; SOCCSKSARGEN, 60; National Capital Region, 59; Western Visayas, 36; Ilocos Region, 28; Cagayan Valley, 33; Central Visayas, 25; MIMAROPA, 24; Eastern Visayas, 21; Northern Mindanao, 19; Zamboanga Peninsula, 17; Bicol Region,16; and Caraga, seven.

(The delinquents from the relatively new Negros Island Region were included in the counts from Western and Central Visayas or Negros Occidental and Oriental. These two now make up Negros Island Region, which was formed only on May 19, 2015 by virtue of Executive Order No. 183.)

The count per region and per province of 882 candidates is closer to the calculated number of individuals at 873, which was derived from subtracting the number of repeated names for candidates who had run in two or more localities.

A big majority of these delinquent candidates had run as independents, or without any political party affiliation.

From parties of presidents

An interesting picture emerges for a subgroup of 131 delinquent candidates who had run for district representative, governor, and vice governor from the 2007 to the 2013 elections, including 18 candidates running again in the May 2016 elections.

In this subgroup, 87 are independents but a significant number had run as candidates of the national political parties led by the incumbent and former presidents of the country:

* Eleven of the delinquents in this subgroup ran as candidates of the Liberal Party (LP) of President Benigno S. Aquino III;

• Eight from the Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP) of ousted President Joseph Estrada that is part of the opposition United Nationalist Alliance;

• Six from the Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo;

• Seven from the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) party of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos; and

• Five from the Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD) of former President Fidel Ramos.

PCIJ. Non-filers of SOCE, By Party, may 2016

The more prominent names in the list of delinquents include erstwhile rebel leader Nur Misuari who ran for governor of Sulu province in 2007 and 2010, and again for regional governor of ARMM in 2013. In all three instances, Misuari ran as an independent candidate. And in all three instances, too, he did not file his election spending report.

Yet another is Macario Asistio Jr., who ran for vice mayor in 2010, and mayor in 2013, of Caloocan City, and on both occasions failed to submit his SOCE to the Comelec.

Still a third is Ismael ‘Chuck’ Mathay III, sole son of former long-time Quezon City Mayor Ismael Mathay Jr. Chuck Mathay ran and won as representative of Quezon City’s 2nd District in 2007 and 2010 and, like Asistio, failed to file his SOCE both times.

Running once more

From the roster of delinquent candidates come a few who have again filed their candidacies for various posts in the May 2016 elections. They include

• Kadra Asana Masihul, KBL, Sulu, who ran for provincial governor in 2013, now running for Board Member in the 1st District of Sulu;
• Albert Hans Corvera Palacios, Independent, 4th District Quezon City, who is running for the same position; he ran under the PMP banner in 2013;
• Pablo Camabrejan Villabar, KBL, Davao del Sur, running again for first district representative as an independent as in the 2013 elections;
• Amin Guintawan Sindao, independent, North Cotabato, running again for third district representative;
• Telesforo Magramo Gaan, independent candidate for governor of Romblon;
• Delfina Dorman Bicatulo, independent candidate for governor of Bukidnon;
• Ahmadjan Marogong Abdulcarim, independent candidate for governor of Lanao Del Sur;
• Justo III Hernandez Orros, independent candidate for vice governor of La Union; and
• Morsalim Alap-Polao Binnortominoray, Liberal Party candidate for vice governor of Lanao Del Sur, but independent candidate in 2013.

The lone candidate for senator, Greco Belgica, had challenged the inclusion of his name in the Comelec’s disqualification list when it first came out in December 2015. In a text message, he told the Philippine Daily Inquirer: “I filed and signed my SOCE in 2007 and 2013 so I cannot be charged for not filing my SOCE. Someone must be manipulating the records. The question is who?”

Belgica, Manila city councilor from 2004 to 2007, was a lead petitioner in a case that was filed before the Supreme Court in 2013 questioning the constitutionality of the pork-barrel system.

Weak parties

According to PulseAsia Research President Ronald Holmes, who is also a political science professor at De La Salle University, the presence of a big majority of “independent” candidates in the list of delinquents illustrates the weakness of the political party system in the country.

Notably, too, many of the candidates on the list have shifted from one to another political party across election years. This is consistent, Holmes says, with the culture of “turncoatism” or the relative ease by which politicians affiliate with different, but usually the dominant, political parties, during regime shifts.

“We don’t have substantive political parties in this country,” says Holmes. “They are basically absent. The large number of independents is not surprising and may simply mean that one does not have to be affiliated to run, and maybe even win, during the elections.”

When one considers the dynamics between politicians once they are in office, however, a different picture emerges.

At a recent public forum, Ateneo School of Government Dean Ronald Mendoza tackled political turncoatism by the candidates in regard to their quest for resources during election campaigns.

“On the local level, for example, it would be easier to engage the national government if you are allied with the current dominant party,” Mendoza said. “This can be in terms of resources, like budgets, and approvals for policies and contracts you want in your jurisdiction.”

PCIJ. Non-filers of SOCE, By Position, may 2016

No party discipline

This is not necessarily incongruous to Holmes’s assessment of the weakness of political parties during elections. Holmes even expresses little optimism when asked if political parties should or could be held responsible for policing their members who did not file their SOCEs.

“The parties themselves do not have that discipline,” he says. “Even at the national level, the dominating party is not necessarily strong or unified.”

For instance, after the May 2010 elections, “the Liberal Party was dominant but they couldn’t agree on who among them was supposed to be Senate President,” Holmes points out. “So someone not from the party took the position.”

Juan Ponce Enrile of the Nacionalista Party was elected Senate President in 2010 by a fragile coalition of political parties in the Upper Chamber.

Even the past presidents have had a history of party switching, Holmes says, adding that, “independence” is primarily a legal label than an individuality of thought or principles. Being an independent candidate, he says, simply means one was not formally nominated or affiliated with a party.

In Holmes’s book, it is highly possible that a majority of “independent” candidates on the list of delinquents may have had informal connections with the established political parties.

“They may,” he says. “This is largely determined by the dynamics on the ground and how they engage each other to achieve their goals. Take Grace Poe, for example. She’s currently independent but she may be ‘adopted’ by present political parties in the long run.”

Clans drive politics

But could, or should, delinquent candidates be allowed to run for office again?

Holmes voices concern that other than Comelec, political clans continue to drive the choice of candidates and the results of elections in many parts of the country.

“There are many powerful families and they can take control of representation mechanisms in their territories,” he observes. “The head of a political clan can determine what happens more than any external body, the Commission on Elections included.”

In areas where virulent clans with private armies rule, election officials may be hard put enforcing Comelec’s decision to disqualify delinquent candidates.

Still and all, in October 2015, when Comelec first came out with its initial list of delinquent candidates, CFO head Commissioner Lim had declared the poll body’s commitment to uphold the rule of law.

He told reporters that it was the first time Comelec had spelled out rules on the filing of petitions for disqualification of candidates who had failed to submit election spending reports to the poll body.

But because the rules provide the delinquents the opportunity to file appeals, Comelec can only collect and impose fines on such candidates until the CFO’s decision becomes final and executory.

Schedule of fines

On June 12, 2012, in Resolution No. 9476, Comelec said that for failure to file SOCEs for the first time, candidates, depending on the elective post they had run for, must pay an administrative fine ranging from P1,000 to P30,000, and for the second offense, from P2,000 to P60,000.

That could mean a tidy sum for Comelec – that is, if it does go after the delinquents to collect the fines and the candidates actually pay up.

For the 2013 elections alone, Comelec Chairman Andres Bautista had told reporters that 4,677 or about one in 10 of the candidates who ran for elective positions (net of the party-list groups) had failed to file their SOCEs, as of the deadline of July 2013. Bautista’s estimate is that the poll body could raise up to P52 million in fines from these delinquents.

But until the Comelec’s decision to perpetually bar these candidates from running for public office, becomes final and executory, there is only one, final, true judge and jury on these cases: the Filipino voter. — PCIJ, April 2016
______________________________________________
For details, check out PCIJ’s Money Politics Online

PCIJ Advisory: Duterte SALN story

WE SEEM to have offended strongly partisan political sensitivities with our story on the SALN for 2015 of presidential frontrunner and Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte.

Just to be clear: We computed for percentage change in the net worth of the candidates for president, covering their first to their latest available SALNs on PCIJ’s file, to get our starting and end values.

On certain years, some of them did not file or had no available SALNs. In the absence of net worth values for the missing years, it would be difficult to derive the weighted average of the growth in their wealth, year on year.

We thank you all for your kind interest in our stories. We love numbers in a phenomenal way and remain non-partisan in a phenomenal way.

802 unopposed local bets in areas with 6.8-M voters

By Vino Lucero

THE IDEAL situation in any election is that two or more candidates fight for a seat, and they earn the votes through the merit of their platform, their track record, and their stand on issues.

In many areas in next Monday’s balloting, however, many candidates are running unopposed, or without any challengers to the throne. With no rival to worry about, it is possible that these candidates have been using their spare time to campaign for local party mates and their party’s national standard bearer and senatorial bets.

PCIJ. 2016 Unopposed, By Region

PCIJ curated data from the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on the candidates who are more than likely to be occupants of local positions in the next three years, simply because no one is running against them in the upcoming polls.

A total of 802 candidates for local positions – from provincial governor to municipal or city councilors – are running unopposed for the May 9, 2016 elections.

Of this number, 215 are vying to be city or municipal mayor and 249, to be city or municipal vice mayor. By many accounts, they are the not-so-secret weapons of national candidates and political parties eager to snare as much as 6.8 million votes altogether clustered in their localities.

Interestingly, 364 or 45 percent of the 802 names on the Comelec’s list of unopposed candidates are affiliated with the administration Liberal Party (LP), based on their Certificates of Candidacy (COC).

Another 101 of the unchallenged candidates, meanwhile, are from the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), 92 from the National Unity Party (NUP), 70 from the United Nationalist Alliance (UNA), 68 from the Nacionalista Party, 62 are independent, and 45 from other parties.

PCIJ. 2016 Unopposed Candidates, By Party

Quid pro quo?

Of course, the willingness of local leaders to deliver votes for particular national candidates could turn into a simple quid pro quo equation. It may be dependent on the ability of the parties to grant what the unopposed politicos want in return. As Center for Local and Regional Governance (CLRG) Director Erwin Alampay points out, it is “not automatic” that unopposed local bets will actually deliver votes for their party’s national candidates.

“They might want to ask for machinery support or campaign donations,” he says, “so that they can conduct proper local campaigns for [national candidates] and their local slates.”

The number of registered voters where unopposed local candidates hold sway, however, may convince national candidates and their parties to do whatever they can to please the local bosses. As it is, the 215 cities and towns where the mayoralty race has just one candidate have a total of 5,915,756 registered voters. That’s more than 10 percent of the total number nationwide.

A bulk of the unopposed tally in fact can be found at the municipal/city level. Of the total 802 candidates without rivals, 194 are running for municipal mayor, 21 for city mayor, 226 for municipal vice mayor, and 23 for city vice-mayor. More than 30 cities and municipalities also have the same or fewer councilor candidates than there are seats to be filled, resulting in 250 candidates for councilor running unopposed.

“It is always good to have opposing voices in the local leadership, and that strives if candidates are from different parties,” says Alampay. “But in the case of unopposed slates, alternative voices may be shut off in the discussion of the local council.”

PCIJ. Vote Reach, Unopposed Mayor Bets

Wannabe mayor

In any case, it is LP that has more candidates for mayor running unopposed: 103. The municipalities and cities where these candidates are running have a total population of 2,497,877 registered voters.

NPC is a far second in terms of its number of unopposed mayoralty candidates: 24. And even then, the cities and towns were these candidates are running have a lower number of voters – 656,222.

In contrast, the 21 unchallenged mayoralty candidates of NP represent 1,063,696 voters.

NUP also has 21 unopposed bets for mayor, but the cities and municipalities where they are running have only a total number of 605,505 voters.

UNA has 17 mayoralty candidates without rivals in cities and municipalities that have a total of 305,978 voters.

Of course, aside from their own unopposed bets for mayor, the national political parties can also reach out to the independent candidates. Sixteen of these independents are running unopposed as mayors, with their respective bailiwicks having a total of 313,032 voters altogether. (The smaller parties, meantime, have managed to have 13 unopposed mayoralty bets as well, with their cities and municipalities having a total of 473,446 registered voters.)

PCIJ. Vote Reach, Unopposed Vice Mayor Bets

Wannabe vice mayor

Other possible helping hands that the national parties and candidates can seek are those of candidates for vice mayor who are running unopposed. Although their political clout may not be as strong as the mayoralty bets, these unchallenged vice-mayoralty candidates most probably have their own circle of loyal supporters among their town or city’s voters.

All in all, the 249 unopposed candidates for vice mayor can bring as much as 6,756,586 registered voters to the election table.

Among the parties, LP again has the most number of unopposed bets for vice mayor at 111, with a potential voter reach of 2,337,788 million. NPC is second with 33, with a potential voter reach of 904,721; NUP 32, with 849,540 voter reach; NP 25, with 1,125,160 voter reach; and UNA 19, with 547,182 voter reach. Independents running unopposed for vice mayor number 11, with a total potential voter reach of 381,288, while smaller parties have 18 unchallenged vice-mayor bets, with a total voter reach of 610,907.

Eleven candidates for vice governor are also running unopposed across the nation, 33 for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan member, and 32 for district representative.

PCIJ. 2016 Unopposed Candidates, By Position

A bounty in ARMM

Among the regions across the country, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) has the most number of unopposed candidates followed by Ilocos Region with 94, Region VI (Western Visayas) with 79, Caraga region with 53, and Region X (Northern Mindanao) with 50.

Of the unopposed in ARMM, 23 are running as municipal mayors, one as city mayor, 27 as municipal vice mayor, one as city vice mayor, and 96 as municipal councilors.

Metro Manila or the National Capital Region (NCR) is at the bottom of the region roster with only 11 unopposed bets, closely followed by Bicol Region with just 15 unchallenged candidates.

In NCR, each of Quezon City’s four Congressional districts has only one candidate running to represent it. Taguig has only one candidate each for mayor and vice mayor. Parañaque has a sole candidate for mayor, as does Navotas, which also has one vice mayoralty candidate. Manila’s 2nd Legislative District and Marikina’s 2nd Legislative District each has just one candidate for Congress.

Twelve provinces – six from Luzon, two from the Visayas, and four from Mindanao – have only one candidate each signed up for the gubernatorial race in the upcoming elections: Bataan, Pampanga, Camiguin, Agusan del Sur, Dinagat Islands, Davao Occidental, Biliran, Apayao, Mountain Province, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, and Negros Occidental. – PCIJ, May 2016

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For details, please check out PCIJ and PCIJ’s Money Politics Online

Duterte’s 2015 SALN: P14.8-M cash in bank, tops rivals in wealth growth

By Malou Mangahas

SO HOW MUCH is he really worth?

According to his 2015 Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth or SALN,
presidential frontrunner and Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte has a net worth for 2015 of only P23,514,569.93, or a slight P1.54-million increase in his declared net worth in 2014.

Duterte’s “cash on hand/in bank”, according to his latest SALN, was just P14,839,69.93, as of Dec. 31, 2015.

Duterte filed his SALN for 2015 early — on April 21, 2016, or nine days ahead of the April 30 deadline.

In contrast, until yesterday noon, Vice President Jejomar ‘Jojo’ C. Binay, another candidate for president, had yet to file his SALN for 2015 with the Office of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, there is a waiting period of 10 working days to secure the 2015 SALNs of fellow presidentiables Senators Grace Poe and Miriam Defensor-Santiago – that is, if they have already submitted these. Former Interior and Local Governments Secretary Manuel ‘Mar’ Roxas II, though, will not have to file a SALN this time around, since he is no longer a government official.

Interest in Duterte’s SALNs has surged following allegations that he has bank accounts through which hundreds of millions of pesos have supposed passed through. For sure, certified bank records may be needed for anyone to prove or disprove such allegations. But what Duterte’s SALNs do show is a phenomenal growth rate over the last 19 years.

The earliest SALN Duterte had filed that is on PCIJ’s archives is for the year 1997, in which he declared a net worth of only P897,792.

The Davao City mayor’s net worth of P23.5 million for 2015 redounds to a 2,519 percent increase, or a phenomenal growth rate of 132.6 percent on average per year, over the last 19 years.

By comparison, Binay’s net worth grew from P2.9 million in 1989 to P60.20 million in his SALN for 2014, for a cumulative increase of 1,975 percent in 25 years, or an average of 79 per cent per year.

Roxas, the administration Liberal Party’s candidate for president, reported a net worth of P12.76 million in 1993, and grew this to P202.08 million in 2014. This results in a 1,483 percent growth in 21 years, or 70.61 percent on average per a year.

Defensor-Santiago, candidate for president of the People’s Reform Party, showed a modest uptick in her declared net worth — from P48.00 million in 1994 to P73.03 million in 2014, for a 52.14 percent growth in 20 years, or 2.6 percent annual average growth.

And then there is the case of Poe, presidential bet of the Galing at Puso slate, which is one of progressively declining wealth. Poe declared a net worth of P152.5 million in 2010, but this slipped steadily to P89.46 million in her SALN for 2014, for a net regression of 41.34 percent in four years, or negative 10.32 percent on average per year.

Although far from being “perfect” financial reporting instruments, SALNs often contain interesting information about a public official or candidate’s wealth, regardless of whether or not the official or candidate had been forthright about all the details.

For instance, in his latest SALN for 2015 that PCIJ obtained from the Office of the Ombudsman, Duterte said he also owned:

• P3 million flat in “investments”;
• P350,000 in household appliances and furniture;
• P300,000 in jewelry; and
• four pieces of residential real property worth only P480,000 by acquisition cost.

He said he acquired these lots, all located in Bago Aplaya, Davao City, between 1995 and 1996.

Also declared among his “personal properties” are two vehicles — a Toyota RAV 4 acquired in 1996 for supposedly P800,000, and a “Volks Sedan” acquired in 1978 supposedly for P40,000.

In a separate page, however, Duterte listed a second set of “assets, liabilities, and net worth” and additional properties “including those of the spouse and unmarried children below 18 years of age being in the declarant’s household.”

Duterte named his 11-year-old daughter by his second partner in this separate assets list.

On this list are five real properties. Duterte said three lots are located in Maa, Davao City, one house and lot in Matina, Davao City, all reportedly acquired from 1997 to 1998, and a second house and lot located in Buhangin, Davao City that he said he purchased in 2008.

Yet still on another page of his 2015 SALN, Duterte listed a third set of real properties that he noted were “purchased through the exclusive funds of (the mother of his 11-year-old daughter), Cielito S. Avancena.”

This third set of properties includes three lots — two agricultural and one residential — located in Matina, Malagos, and Catigan, all in Davao City; and two house and lots in Matina; Davao City.

Duterte valued this final set of real properties at P3.08 million, by acquisition cost.

On this separate page, too, Duterte listed a “personal loan” of P1.2 million from a certain “Samuel Uy”.

In his SALN for 2014, Duterte had declared a net worth of P21 ,971,732.62, including combined real and personal properties of P22,971,732.62, and liabilities of only P1 million to a certain “Samuel Uy”.

In his 2015 SALN, Duterte declared his business interest in two entities — as incorporator since 1997 of Honda Cars, with business address at Catolico Street, General Santos City; and as incorporator since 2012 of Poeng Yue Foundation, Inc., with business address on San Pedro Street in Davao City.

As in his 2014 SALN, in his 2015 SALN Duterte listed having six relatives in the government service. They are:

• Son Paolo Z. Duterte, vice mayor of Davao City;
• Daughter-in-law January N. Duterte, councilor of Davao City;
• Brother Benjamin R. Duterte, his private secretary at the Davao City Mayor’s Office;
• Nephew Wilfrido D. Villarica, Administrative Officer 1, at the Davao City Council;
• Jean Villarica, wife of Wilfrido, Auxiliary Worker of Davao City’s Environment and Natural Resources Office; and
“Balae” Agnes Reyes-Carpio, mother of the spouse of his daughter Sara, Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals

Nineteen years ago, when he was a congressman from Davao City, Duterte had
declared owning seven real properties that he said he acquired for a combined cost of P603,700; and personal properties worth P3,250,092. The latter included, he said, “cash on hand/in bank” of only P189,245; cars and motorcycles worth P1,206,482; and “investments” of P1,556,250.

That same year, 1997, Duterte said he had “miscellaneous payables” amounting to P2,956,000.

Two years earlier in 1995, he said he invested a total of P1,556,250 in “Mister Donuts” outlets located in Ulas, Agado, P. Reyes, and Ecoland, all in Davao City.

Notably, like his net worth, Duterte’s “cash on hand/in bank” has charted an upward trek in the last two decades, save for one year.

In 1998, Duterte said he had P339,245 “cash on hand/in bank” and net worth of
P1,047,792 as of December that year.

In 1999, he declared exactly the same amount of “cash on hand/in bank”, but also a bigger net worth of P1,447,542.

In 2000, his “cash on hand/in bank” grew to P512,135, and his net worth, P1,766,722.

In 2002, it climbed to P889,441, and his net worth, P2,834,028.

In 2004, it jumped to P3,220,312, and his net worth, P7,024,899.

In 2005, it rose to P4,621,193, and his net worth, P8,425,780.

In 2006, it became P6,071,460, and his net worth, P8,650,627.

In 2007, he declared it at P7,079,199, and his net worth, P9,685,366.

In 2008, he put it at P7,514,124. This excludes what he declared to be P1,138,890 in premiums paid for educational plans; P1,305,953 in “private inheritance”; P454,500 in premiums paid for pre-need plans; P686,833 in time deposits; and P65,625 in stocks.

His declared net worth for 2008 was P15,315,925.08.

In 2009, the amount of Duterte’s “cash on hand/in bank” climbed to P9,164,204.32, and his net worth, P16,616,005.40.

In 2011, he put it at P11,155,123.12, and his net worth, P18,930,123.12.

In 2014, he declared it to be P13,846,732.62, and his net worth, P21,971,732.62.

In his latest SALN for 2015, Duterte said his “cash on hand/in bank” was all of P14,839,69.93. — With research by Vino Lucero and Davinci S. Maru, PCIJ, May 2016

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For details on the wealth of the candidates, check out PCIJ’s Money Politics Online