Category: Investigative Reports

Duterte’s war: CHR mounts probeof 103 drug killings and counting

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By Karol Ilagan
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism

ON TOP of Bayani Arago’s desk at the Commission on Human Rights National Capital Region (CHR NCR) is a pile of clippings now about an inch thick. The news reports, which Arago began collecting last July 1, tell stories of various police encounters that almost always end up with the same outcome: a drug suspect dead.

“Ito ang mabigat (This is tough),” he says. “Every day, I look at newspapers, and that’s all I see. On Saturdays and Sundays, that’s what I read. So many are getting killed and the only thing I see are killings.”

The bodies are piling up as an apparent result of President Rodrigo R. Duterte’s anti-drug campaign, and Arago, officer-in-charge of CHR NCR’s Protection and Monitoring Division, has made it his duty to keep track of the dead.

So far, he has identified at least 33 incidents related to the campaign that will be investigated motu propio or on the commission’s own initiative. In addition, CHR NCR has assigned priority to its investigation of six complaints filed by the surviving kin of those who had been killed.

The Commission on Human Rights, an independent office created by the Constitution, is the national human rights institution of the Philippines.

Since its formation in 1987, the CHR has investigated human-rights violations involving civil and political rights. It had investigated the 2007 enforced disappearance of activist Jonas Burgos. In 2009, it looked into the summary killings associated with the Davao Death Squad linked to then Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte. More recently, CHR launched one of the first human-rights investigations into the accountability of companies for the adverse impacts of climate change.

A multitude of cases involving crime and security, and women and children has kept the Commission constantly occupied. But the unusually high number of drug deaths since Duterte assumed the presidency three weeks ago is now making CHR work double – perhaps even triple – time to accomplish its tasks.

At CHR NCR, for instance, investigators typically work in teams specific to cases like rubout, torture, and unlawful arrest. These days, majority of the office’s 20 investigators are looking into the extrajudicial killings spawned by Duterte’s war against drugs.

Swamped with work

“Actually, our investigators are now almost working 24/7,” says CHR Commissioner Leah Armamento. “They cannot finish their reports quickly because there’s so much to do.”

Across the country, many of CHR’s regional offices have also shifted their attention on possible human-rights violations in the course of the new administration’s anti-drug campaign. In addition, CHR has formed a national task force specific to extrajudicial killings, which it expects to rise in number.

But apart from issuing statements and making recommendations, there may be little that CHR can do to ensure that justice is being served and the rights of the suspects respected. Already burdened with all sorts of handicaps, including limited resources, it had even managed to irritate Duterte himself early on, prompting him to call CHR Chairman Jose Luis Martin ‘Chito’ Gascon an “idiot.”

In his June 30 inaugural speech, President Duterte also pointedly asked Congress and CHR “to allow us a level of governance that is consistent to our mandate.” He said that as a lawyer and a former prosecutor, he knows the limits of his authority as president and what is legal and what is not.

Maim, not kill

The way Duterte’s war on drugs has unfolded, however, has raised questions on whether due process and fair trial are accorded suspected drug criminals, among other things. Armamento for one says that police officials are supposed to follow standard procedures such as reading a suspect his or her Miranda rights, which include the right to remain silent, right to counsel, and the right to be informed. Likewise, in the event that a suspect poses threat, officers are instructed to maim or render him or her defenseless – but still breathing.

“Hindi mo siya tinatamaan sa ulo, which is fatal, o sa puso (You don’t shoot them in the head or chest, which is fatal),” says Armamento, “You don’t kill them because you have to surrender them to the court and then serve justice.”

What’s alarming for the CHR commissioner is that the police appear to be acting like “eager beavers,” wanting to prove to Duterte that they can comply with his directive to rid the streets of criminals.

“None in our legal system allows killing,” she says.

5 regions, 103 cases

The CHR Task Force created to investigate cases of extrajudicial killings is still collecting data from all the regions. But as of July 25, the regional offices of CHR in NCR, Region I (Ilocos Region), Region II (Cagayan Valley), Cordillera Administrative Region, and Region XII (Soccsksargen) are already investigating or reviewing at least 103 such cases.

The total includes 39 cases in NCR; 27 cases in Region I; 15 cases in Region II; 13 cases in the Cordillera Administrative Region; and nine cases in Region XII.

These numbers include cases where the suspect was killed in a police operation, or by an unidentified assailant.

Of the six regional CHR offices PCIJ called on July 22 and July 25, only NCR had a good number of walk-in complainants. CAR, Region I, Region II, Region IV, and Region XII are mostly, if not only, working on motu propio cases or cases that CHR has decided to pursue on its own.

Whether or not there is a complaint, the CHR is constitutionally mandated to “investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.” Obviously, though, having a formal complaint helps in building a case. Without someone who has direct knowledge about the case, an investigator would have to start from scratch to get details about the case, as well as leads and pieces of evidence.

Indigents mostly

In Region XII, CHR Officer in Charge Erlan Deluvio says they do not typically receive walk-ins because families of most rights victims are indigents. They wouldn’t have the money to spare for travel to visit their office, he says. All the nine cases CHR Region XII is investigating that are connected to the current administration’s war on drugs are motu propio.

Most of the 13 similar cases under CHR CAR are also motu propio investigations. According to CHR CAR Officer in Charge Romel Daguimol, people in Cordillera are not so inclined to pursue cases because it’s not in their culture to make complaints.

For Director Jacqueline dela Peña of CHR Region IV, personal complaints also depend on how determined the surviving kin is to seek redress from government. She says it depends on the character of the individual, as well as the support he or she gets from the community.

Dela Peña says, however, that they may not receive walk-in complaints arising from the recent spate of killings of drug suspects until after the families of the dead have taken time to grieve.

Deluvio of CHR Region XII says they reach out to the victims’ families and motivate them to participate in the process. Not all would cooperate, however. Some who might consider pursuing a case also change their minds because, Deluvio says, they are also easily intimidated by opposing parties.

Limited resources

It doesn’t also help when law enforcement is uncooperative. Police reports are part and parcel of any investigation, but CHR investigators find it hard to get such records in cases involving the police themselves. This would then mean CHR would have to do more spadework, but like most government offices, this is a body operating on limited resources.

The good news is that starting in 2015, CHR has been getting funds more than what it proposes in the annual budget. For the year 2016, it sought a budget of P428.5 million, and then received P460 million.

Still, among the nation’s five constitutional agencies, CHR has the smallest number of staff. In 2015, it had positions open for 680 but only 526 were filled.

“Kung noon nga, kulang na, lalo na ngayon (The resources were already not enough before, but the lack is even more so now),” Deluvio of CHR Region XII says. CHR Region XII itself has only seven active investigators and two vehicles. An investigator could be working on 12 cases at least at a time, and carpooling has become the norm whenever fieldwork is called for.

In Region IV, where the number of drug-related killings is on the high side, the CHR regional office also has only seven investigators. These investigators cover Laguna, Batangas, Quezon, and the whole of MIMAROPA.

No CHR charter

CHR Region IV Director Dela Peña says they are trying their best to respond to needs, but the influx of cases really makes the job harder. She says the passage of the CHR’s charter, which could pave the way for more resources and personnel, is crucial.

The proposed CHR charter aims to strengthen the Commission’s investigative powers and expand its quasi-judicial powers that include preventive and legal measures such as the issuance of an injuction order, order to transfer persons, and restraining order. But in the last several years, attempts to form this charter have failed in Congress.

Armamento says the drug-related killings has spurred CHR in coordinating with various law groups to help it in any way they can. Among these law groups are the Free Legal Assistance Group, Mabini, and the Philippine Association of Law Schools. CHR has also reached out to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Apart from additional funding, Armamento says the president can also help by stressing the importance of respect for law, human rights, and that no extrajudicial killing should take place during police operations.

“That will help a lot because police officers being part of the executive branch will always obey the president,” she says.

Davao Death Squad

It is still too early to say what will become of CHR’s efforts to respond to the rise of killings of drug suspects. But the results of its investigation into the summary killings in Davao City some seven years ago could be some indication on what could happen next.

The CHR investigation in 2009 had been prompted by a growing concern, inside and outside the country, over the numerous dead bodies turning up across Davao City that time.

The Commission found “a systematic failure on the part of the local officials to conduct any meaningful investigation into said killings, thereby violating the State’s obligation to protect the rights of its citizens.” CHR thus recommended the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate “the possible administrative and criminal liability of Mayor Duterte for his inaction in the face of evidence of numerous killings committed in Davao City and his toleration of the commission of those offenses.”

In March 2012, the Ombudsman found 21 police officers — but not Duterte — guilty of simple neglect of duty. The officers faced penalties ranging from one-month suspension to a fine equal to a month’s salary.

In May 2016, the sole witness in the Department of Justice’s subsequent investigation into the Davao Death Squad left the government’s witness protection program, putting a halt into the probe. In the same month, Duterte won the presidency. — With additional reporting by Davinci Maru, PCIJ, July 2016

Duterte’s war: Big kill of small fry, puny drugs haul, defies PNP rules

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BANGKAY SA BANGKETA… kasi nga drug pusher ako.

This is the sad refrain in a sardonic poem that a young Filipina wrote and read in a video she posted last week on her Facebook page. It does not matter, she averred, that the so-called drug pushers falling by the dozens of late had not been read their rights or tried in court. Or even, that they had been killed by those who are supposed to protect them and enforce the law. Perhaps, she wrote, those who kill are drug pushers, too.

Indeed, a pall of death has cloaked the nation in mixed glee, grief, confusion, and anxiety in the first three weeks alone of the war on drugs of President Rodrigo R. Duterte, who will deliver his first state of the nation address today.

But who will be killed next is not quite clear as yet. In the meantime, the question of why the poor and puny pushers are dying in high numbers compared to just a handful of their rich counterparts, the drug lords, and their supposed coddlers in the police has been either inadequately answered or ignored.

By the data of the police — until now the singular source of information of the news media about the war on drugs — about 10 bodies have been showing up by the road and in the slums every day, or a total of 213 killed in Duterte’s first 21 days in office alone. The casualty toll includes 209 civilians and only four policemen that the police had tagged as alleged drug pushers.

Combatting drugs has always been a major police activity over the last seven years. Then and now, however, the PNP’s reports on the supposed “achievements” of the campaign have risen and fallen, across regions of the country.

By official PNP reports, Duterte’s war on drugs has netted much bigger numbers of those killed and arrested in its initial rollout period but also smaller seizures of drugs, by value and volume.

By all indications, however, Duterte’s war has assumed a random, free-for-all, brook-no-limits in law and due process, a kill-at-will campaign against mostly small-time drug suspects. This is happening despite the explicit rules of the 200-page Philippine National Police Handbook PNPM-Do-Ds-3-2-13 or Revised PNP Manual on Operational Procedures published in December 2013.

Cookie Diokno of the Free Legal Assistance Group of human rights lawyers says the big difference in the war on drugs then and now is this: Duterte’s war has flipped the “burden of proof” principle in the statutes inside out. In other words, says Diokno, “you are now presumed guilty, until proven innocent.”

Compared with data on the PNP’s anti-drug campaign in the 78 months from January 2010 to June 2016, Duterte’s three-week-old war has upped the numbers of alleged drug users and pushers killed and arrested multiple-fold.

The downside is Duterte’s war is unfolding with negligible documentation of the conduct of police operations and the death of suspects. In a majority of cases, the suspects were killed purportedly because they “resisted arrest” or tried to snatch the guns of and engaged arresting officers in a firefight.

Data from PNP’s Anti-Illegal Drugs Group (AIDG) in the 78 months before Duterte came to power, showed much lower numbers of casualties and arrests made, but also bigger values and volumes of drugs seized, compared to that recorded in the new government’s three-week war.

The 213 drug suspects killed under Duterte’s war from Jully 1 to 21, 2016 (an average of 10 persons a day) is a macabre figure compared to the 256 persons “killed in action” in the 78-month period or 2,336 days from January 2010 to June 2016 (an average of about one person every 10 days).

In the 78 months before Duterte, the PNP had conducted a total of 96,530 anti-drug operations, of which 46 percent were buy-bust operations; 28.4 percent “in flagrante” (the suspects were caught in the act); 16.1 percent via search warrant; 4.6 percent as checkpoint operations; 2.5 percent as “saturation drive”; 1.7 percent as “marijuana eradication” operations; 0.6 percent as “warrant of arrest”; and 0.1 percent as “interdiction.”

The PNP’s reports on Oplan Tokhang, though, do not offer data on how many of the various types of operations against illegal drugs have been conducted with mission orders, and which of these have been covered by search warrants or warrants of arrest. Many data fields in the PNP’s reports on the war on drugs prior to the Duterte administration do not appear anymore in its recent reports.

Yet another story should also raise grave concern among citizens. What drugs and substances, indeed, should be considered illegal?

Of the various types of drugs that the police had confiscated, over-the-counter substances and laboratory chemicals with legitimate but controlled uses have been enrolled, too. These include marijuana resin oil, rugby, Cytotec, ketamine, “Sulfuric,” sodium hydroxide, acetone, chloroform, palladium chloride, hydrochloric acid, Pseudoephedrine and Diazepam.

While most of the seized substances and drugs can only be bought in the black market, some items like hydrochloric acid (also known as muriatic acid), rugby, and acetone are easily available in sari-sari stores and hardware stores and are not on the list of illegal substances. Chemicals like chloroform and toluene are being used in research and industrial laboratories.— PCIJ, July 2016

Sheila Coronel: A Golden Age of Global Muckraking at Hand

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By Sheila Coronel*
From Global Investigative Journalism Network

Editor’s Note: We are pleased to present this transcript of the keynote speech by Columbia University’s Sheila Coronel at the 2016 conference of Investigative Reporters and Editors on June 19. Coronel, who has played a key role in spreading investigative journalism worldwide, spoke to 1,850 people — the largest ever gathering of investigative journalists — about networks, collaborations, nonprofits, and a new golden age of global muckraking.
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TEN YEARS AGO, when I first moved to New York and gave my first lecture at the Columbia Journalism School, I told students that I believe we are at the dawn of a Golden Age of global muckraking. They were a great class, but they didn’t believe me.

But look at where we are now: It may not feel like it to some of you, but we are seeing, like never before, an explosion of investigative reporting around the world. There are now over 100 investigative reporting centers and organizations outside the U.S. Today, there are muckrakers even in places like Armenia, Bulgaria, Nepal, Venezuela, the Arab world.

Ten years ago, I told my students that I believe we are at the dawn of a Golden Age of global muckraking. They didn’t believe me.

These watchdog groups have seeded the unprecedented collaboration of journalists working across borders and across newsrooms. This past year has shown us how far international investigative reporting has come. Three examples.

This was the year the Panama Papers shook the world. Some 400 reporters from nearly 80 countries produced stories that made headlines everywhere. Their reporting on a leak of 11 million documents from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca caused the downfall of Iceland’s prime minister, Spain’s industry minister and Armenia’s most senior justice official. It also sparked tax evasion and money laundering investigations in several continents.

Working together under the direction of the International Consortium for Investigative Journalists, these reporters proved ¬– once and for all – that there is no such thing as offshore secrecy. Thanks to them, tax-evading billionaires, kleptocrats, drug lords and assorted money launderers are quaking in their private jets. They can run but they can’t hide.

Also this year, Seafood from Slaves, an investigation by the Associated Press, won the Pulitzer Prize’s highest honor. A global team of AP reporters found thousands of poor workers from Laos, Burma, and Cambodia held in bondage by operators of Thai fishing vessels.

The AP’s reporting led to the release of 2,000 slaves like Myint Naing, who had been trafficked from Burma and found on one of the Spice Islands in Indonesia. He had been kept 22 years a slave.
Finally, this is also the year the Azerbaijani journalist Khadija Ismayilova was released from prison.

Khadija was arrested in Dec. 2014 and found guilty of tax evasion, embezzlement and abuse of power. Her reporting had exposed how Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev and his family had snapped up state assets. Using shell companies and nominees, they squirreled their wealth in luxury goods and real estate around the world. And yet it was Khadija, not them, who was accused, tried and jailed.

Khadija would still be behind bars today. But journalists all around the world, including many of you in this room, wrote about her and advocated on her behalf with their own governments and with the EU and the UN.

Her colleagues in the Organized Crime and Corruption Project and elsewhere also collaborated on stories exposing the corruption of the Aliyevs. They called it the Khadija Project, after the IRE’s own Arizona Project.

A lot has been said about how technology has empowered the new global investigative reporting. But it’s not machines that made all this great work possible. It’s people. People like us.

Many of you know that in 1976, a team of investigative reporters from IRE got together after Dan Bolles, an investigative journalist at the Arizona Republic, was killed by a car bomb. They agreed to continue reporting the story that Bolles had not lived to tell.

Their principle was: You can kill the journalist, but not the story.

Similarly, the Khadija Project’s message to the Aliyevs was: You can jail Khadija, but you cannot put an end to exposés. In the end, the Aliyev government realized that the political cost of keeping Khadija in prison outweighed the benefits of setting her free.

Last month, Khadija was released.

A lot has been said about how technology has empowered the new global investigative reporting. The Panama Papers and similar stories benefited from software that allows reporters to communicate and share documents securely across oceans, and from algorithms that enable them to search millions of documents in real time wherever they are.

Dateline New Orleans: Coronel’s record crowd included journalists from 32 countries.

Technology has given us new tools for dealing with big digital leaks and new sources of information, including, as in the case of Seafood from Slaves, ship sensors and satellites.

But let me tell you this: It’s not machines that made all this great work possible. It’s people. People like us. The successes I’ve described demonstrate not so much technological power as collaborative power… the power of individual reporters working together to produce journalism that is greater than the sum of each of their individual efforts.

Since the late 1990s, journalists from around the world have been meeting regularly in conferences and training workshops – like this one — and working jointly on increasingly ambitious cross-border reporting projects. These activities – and also those spirited discussions after hours (and by spirited, I mean alcohol-fueled) – have fostered camaraderie and trust. They have laid the groundwork for a truly global and networked journalism.

The era of the lone wolf is over.

Local and national accountability reporting will continue to be important, but the muckrakers of the future will no longer be so tightly tethered to the nation-state. Crime, corruption, you name it, pollution, human trafficking, money laundering, tax evasion, viruses like Zika, purchases of luxury real estate, the food we eat, the clothes we wear: All these breach national boundaries.

Since the 1990s, journalists from around the world have been meeting regularly in conferences and workshops. These activities have laid the groundwork for a truly global and networked journalism. The era of the lone wolf is over.

And thanks to a global community of muckrakers, the barriers to doing cross-border reporting are no longer insurmountable.

A borderless world needs watchdogs who can transcend borders. The Panama Papers, the Khadija Project, Offshore Leaks are examples of how this can done. They showcase the new global, networked investigative journalism.

Today, the news industry is facing huge challenges in terms of falling revenues. Moreover, all around the world — even in countries that have a free press — governments, corporations and in too many cases, terrorists and demagogues, autocrats and mafia lords, are stifling independent reporting.

There is no silver bullet, no Holy Grail that will end this crisis of news. We are in uncharted terrain. The new, global, networked journalism provides us ONE path forward, ONE model for doing ambitious, high-impact accountability reporting efficiently, rigorously, more cheaply, also more securely.

The most daring and cutting-edge accountability reporting around the world is being done by nonprofits, financially fragile papers or online news sites, and freelancers. They are extremely vulnerable.

This network model is still fluid and evolving. Unlike traditional newsrooms, networked journalism is, for better or for worse, horizontal and non-hierarchical. Membership in the network is informal – there are no membership lists or dues. Members are linked by bonds of reciprocity and trust, and also by self-interest. Units within the network may be competitive, but they choose to share and to work together on specific projects and for particular goals.

Crime and corruption networks work this way and so do jihadist groups. Their activities and lines of communication reach across national borders. Like the mythical Hydra–many heads, hard to find, difficult to exterminate. There are hubs, but no single mission control. Cross-border journalist networks operate the same way, that’s why they are effective. As the Pentagon has now realized about fighting jidhadists, “It takes a network to defeat a network.”

But how can networked journalism be sustained? Until about a decade ago, investigative reporting in the US was robust because it was propped up by a support structure of profitable news organizations that invested in reporting, independent courts that protected press freedom and the right to information, journalism schools that trained the next generation of muckrakers, and prizes that celebrated outstanding work. And of course, there’s IRE. You don’t know how lucky you were, and still are.

Crime and corruption networks reach across national borders. There are hubs, but no single control. Cross-border journalist networks are similar. As the Pentagon now realizes, “It takes a network to defeat a network.”

Elsewhere, there are huge gaps in the support structure. The most daring and cutting-edge accountability reporting around the world is being done by nonprofits, financially fragile newspapers or online news sites, and freelancers. They can barely scrape the money for ambitious reporting. They are also extremely vulnerable to legal harassment and physical threats. In these places, the courts are compromised and governments are unable to protect journalists from those who would them harm.
In too many places, investigative reporting is a high wire act – without a safety net.

Behind its many successes, cross-border investigative reporting is a flickering flame. It needs to be funded and protected. But how and by whom? Who pays for a global public good?

For sure, we have vibrant organizations that keep the fire burning. The Global Investigative Journalism Network is the communications & resource hub for watchdogs around the world. GIJN organizes meetings that bring international journalists to talk about tradecraft. Many of the early collaborative reporting projects were conceived in the corridors of these global conferences.
We have watchdog groups in Latin America, Europe, Africa, and the Arab world that train journalists, bring them together to discuss common issues and problems, and also fund their work. The OCCRP reports on the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, and other regions on the issues of crime and corruption. And of course, you are all familiar with ICIJ’s stellar work as a hub for distributed, cross-border reporting. It’s headquartered in Washington, D.C. but its staff is a microcosm of the world: The ICIJ director is Irish & worked in Australia, his deputy is from Argentina; the data team is headed by a Spaniard, my former student Mar Cabra, and the chief data analyst is Costa Rican. And there are some very talented Americans there, too, of course.

But funding is tight. David Kaplan, the guru of GIJN, estimates that donors invest at most $20 million a year in international investigative reporting.

That’s about 0.2% of the 7 billion pounds worth of London real estate secretly purchased by prime ministers, business magnates and others using offshore companies established by Mossack Fonseca. Thanks to the Panama Papers, The Guardian found all these properties. Seven billion pounds.

In other words, the investment in global investigative reporting pays off. Massively. The reforms that the Panama Papers have set in motion worldwide will hopefully result in billions of dollars in recovered wealth or unpaid taxes. The OCCRP estimates that the total of money frozen or paid in fines since it started work has reached $3 billion.

The Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism has nearly single-handedly introduced investigative reporting techniques and the notion of accountability in the Arab world. In the past 10 years it has trained 1,600 journalists, including the Arab reporters who worked on the Panama Papers. If we know now that Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and his allies skirted international sanctions by registering shell companies in places like the Seychelles, it’s because of ARIJ.

What a spectacular return on investment.

Where there is despair that nothing can be done, we offer some hope that if we shine the light on the wrongdoing, the world can be a better place. I am proud to be part of this global community of muckrakers.

In the end, however, the most valuable investments in global watchdog reporting have been made by individual journalists willing to put their lives and their freedoms on the line in order to expose wrongdoing. Khadija Ismayilova remained in Azerbaijan to report, knowing that she would sooner or later end up in jail. Not many of us – I hope – will ever be in her situation but we’re inspired by her courage and strength of purpose.

Hamoud Almahmoud continued teaching an investigative reporting course at the University of Damascus, despite the artillery fire around him. “The university was very close to the frontlines of the fighting,” he recalled “I was teaching despite all the shelling.”

Hamoud is in Amman now, where he is research director of ARIJ. But many of his colleagues in Syria have been killed or fled the country. “We see the window of hope is narrowing,” he told me, “but we are surviving and we are still doing stories.”

Lina Attalah edits the independent website Mada Masr in Egypt that could be closed any time under onerous press laws. But she and her young staff continue to do investigative reporting in order, she says, to “activate the conversation, to reopen the political space, and engage the public in conversation.”

Oscar Martinez heads the investigative unit of El Faro, an online news site in El Salvador. He’s received numerous threats for his stories on gang violence and extrajudicial killings. Last year, he had to flee the country. He’s back but he has panic buttons and other security systems in his house. He can’t even take his three-year-old daughter to the park for fear of attack.

Oscar writes beautifully about the most horrific things that people do to each other. Recalling his reporting on migrants crossing from Central America to the US, this is what he told the Texas Observer:

If there are women who had the courage to tell you how they’d been raped along the path… you as a journalist don’t have the right to just pit that back out onto a page. You have to take the time, dedicate energy and put in a lot of work to write this the best way you can so that that person’s story can generate the feeling of impotence, the rage, the compassion and the hate that it should generate.

Writing, he said, is an ethical responsibility.

For Oscar, for Lina, Hamoud and Khadija, as it is for me, and I’m sure many of you, investigative reporting is more than just exposing the bastards, although that is immensely satisfactory. I started reporting during the twilight of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, when the press was so heavily censored, we couldn’t even publish photographs showing Imelda’s double chin. For me, investigative reporting is about opening up spaces, providing facts to inform intelligent public debate, making readers empathize with the suffering of others.

Where there is despair that everything is broken and nothing can be done, we offer some hope that if we shine the light on the wrongdoing, the world can be a better place. I am proud to be part of this global community of muckrakers. We can; we should; we must keep going and I hope – I KNOW – we will all stand together.

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*Sheila S. Coronel is Dean of Academic Affairs at the Columbia Journalism School and director of the school’s Stabile Center for Investigative Journalism. She is co-founder and former executive director of the pioneering Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, based in Manila.

In last 8 elections, 68 families victors in 6 vote-rich provinces

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By Rowena F. Caronan
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism

PCIJ. Clans, 6 Vote-Rich Provinces, may 2016

LOCAL POLITICAL families, not political parties, are important to national politicians as they mobilize electoral support, says political scientist Julio C. Teehankee. National officials, he explains, typically have strong provincial base. They draw on support from well-entrenched networks of local political families, who often change party affiliations to secure state resources and patronage.

Of 68 recurring family names in six vote-rich provinces, or those with at least eight electoral victories in the last 24 years, at least 14 are affiliated with or have declared support for the Liberal Party (LP) of President Benigno S. Aquino III. The opposition equally has the backing of 14 other families, whereas the rest have unclear affiliation.

From the 1992 to the 2013 elections, these 68 families have won 879 or 20 percent of the combined 4,121 seats in their localities, excluding the city or municipal positions, in Cebu, Cavite, Pangasinan, Laguna, Negros Occidental, and Davao del Sur.

With a total of 10.86 million voters, these provinces can already make or break one national candidate’s electoral bid.

National-local grids

Cebu and Cavite are considered opposition bailiwicks, while Davao del Sur is to the Dutertes and Negros Occidental to the Roxases.

Pangasinan in the far north is part of the solid north bloc of the late strongman Ferdinand E. Marcos that remains a formidable force to reckon with. Laguna, which is a recipient of the continuous urban expansion of Metro Manila, has a mixed political-party landscape.

In 2013, Negros Occidental, Pangasinan, and Cebu were among the provinces with high voter turnout rates at 81.5 percent, 81.4 percent, and 80.8 percent, respectively, or within the national average of 81.2 percent. Laguna (72 percent), Cavite (67 percent), and Davao del Sur (64.3 percent) posted lower voter turnouts.

The political families that have declared support for the candidacy of LP’s standard-bearer Manuel ‘Mar’ A. Roxas III include the Gullases of Cebu, Barzagas and Abayas of Cavite, and Maranons, Ferrers, Escalantes of Negros Occidental.

Although Eduardo ‘Danding’ Cojuangco Jr.’s Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC) is backing Senator Grace Poe’s bid for the presidency, its members and political stalwarts in Negros Occidental and Pangasinan have been allowed to choose who to endorse. Poe also enjoys the support of the Duranos of Cebu, Revillas of Cavite, and incumbent Manila Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada, whose clan dominate the mayoral race in San Juan City and Pagsanjan, Laguna.

Those endorsing the candidacy of United Nationalist Alliance’s (UNA’s) standard-bearer Vice President Jejomar ‘Jojo’ C. Binay are the Ramas of Cebu and Remullas of Cavite. Recently, however, Cavite Governor Juanito Victor ‘Jonvic’ Remulla, erstwhile spokesperson of Binay, jumped shipped to the camp of the current presidential frontrunner, Davao City Mayor Rodrigo ‘Digong’ R. Duterte of Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban).

Duterte has also drawn support from the Garcias of Cebu and former Senator Edgardo J. Angara’s Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). The Angara family is a political clan in the province of Aurora in Central Luzon, but it is not only a vote-poor province with only 126,525,000 voters, but also has a lower voter turnout — just 75.7 percent in 2013.

THE CLANS OF CEBU

PCIJ. Cebu Top clans, may 2016

Cebu has remained on top of the list of provinces with the highest number of voters with 2,722,288 or nearly half of the 6.3 million in Metro Manila, a region of 16 cities and one municipality. Too, Cebu is the center of economic trade in the Visayas, where the bustling metropolitan Cebu City is located. In 2014, Cebu posted the highest financial capacity among the provinces with P28-billion equity, or the difference between the amounts of assets and liabilities of local government units.

Over the last 24 years, majority of Cebu’s 1,021 elected officials, excluding the town council members, had run under LP’s rival parties such as the LDP and Lakas, including LAKAS-Christian Muslim Democrats (LKS-CMD) and LAKAS-Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (LKS-KAM).

Regional and provincial political parties in Cebu rarely coalesced with the LP. Aside from the LDP and Lakas, they were often associated instead with the Nacionalista Party (NP), NPC, and UNA. (UNA’s earlier name was United Opposition or UNO.)

In Cebu’s local elections from 1992 to 2013, 14 clans each have had members elected at least 10 times to a variety of seats: congressional, gubernatorial, mayoral, and vice mayoral. The Duranos had 57 electoral victories in the fifth congressional district, Danao City, and towns of Samboan and Sogod. Next to the Duranos are:

• the Martinezes with 20 in the fourth district, Bogo City, and San Remigio;
• the Garcias with 18 in the second and third districts and gubernatorial races;
• the Yaphas with 17 in the third district and Pinamungahan;
• the Ramas with 14 in Cebu City and Poro;
• the Abineses with 13 in the second district, vice gubernatorial races, and Oslob and Santander;
• the Binghays with 12 in Balamban;
• the Fernandezes with 11 in Talisay City and Pilar;
• and 10 each for the Osmenas in the third district and Cebu City, the Creuses in Malabuyoc, the Radazas in Lapu-Lapu City and its lone district, the Wenceslaos in Santander, the Bacaltoses in Sibonga, and the Arquillanos in San Francisco.

These families have controlled Cebu’s influential political parties at the provincial level, including the Bando Osmeña Pundok Kauswagan (BOPK) and Probinsya Muna Development Initiative (PROMDI) of the Osmeñas, Alang sa Kalambuan ug Kalinaw (ALAYON) led by the Gullases in the first district, and Partido Panaghiusa led by the Ramas. Its two leading provincial parties in the last three elections, from 2007 to 2013, were the Barug Alang sa Kauswagan ug Demokrasya (BAKUD) formed by the Duranos in 2001, and One Cebu party, by the Garcias in 2007.

The Durano-led Bakud party supported former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s Lakas party in 2010. It shifted alliance to NPC and, in 2013, joined the LP coalition. At the time, the feuding family had siblings running for the same position under different political affiliations. In the 2016 polls, though, there are no family members up against each other. But instead of LP’s standard-bearer Roxas and their distant relative, PDP-Laban’s Duterte, the family is supporting Poe largely because a member of the family, Joseph Felix Mari ‘Ace’ H. Durano, serves as one of her campaign managers. Ace Durano is the nephew of Duterte. His father, Danao City Mayor Ramon ‘Nito’ D. Durano III, and the Davao City mayor are second-degree cousins.

The Duranos used to be long-time allies of the Garcias, who were affiliated with the Lakas party in 2010 and UNA in 2013. The two broke ties in 2013 when the Duranos supported the candidacy of LP’s gubernatorial bet, Hilario Davide III, who was running against a Garcia. Last month, the Garcia-led One Cebu party formally declared its support for Duterte and vowed to deliver a one-million vote difference. One Cebu claimed to have dropped its alliance with UNA because, it said, the latter lacked appreciation and reciprocation of One Cebu’s loyalty.

Of the other 12 prominent families in Cebu’s political scene, only the Martinezes, Yaphas, Wenceslaos, and Osmenas fielded candidates under the LP in 2013. The Ramas, Fernandezes, and Arquillanos ran under the Bakud party and UNA. The Binghays and Creuses were associated with One Cebu party, while the Bacaltoses were with the NP and the Radazas with the Lakas party. The Abineses were last elected in 2004 under the Lakas party.

In the 2016 polls, members of the Martinez, Yapha, Wenceslao, and Radaza families are running under the LP. The Gullas-led Alayon also showed support for Roxas, but maintained its support for fellow NP members Senators Alan Peter S. Cayetano, Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ R. Marcos Jr., and Antonio ‘Sonny’ F. Trillanes IV, who all are vying for the vice presidential position.

THE CLANS OF CAVITE

PCIJ. Cavite Top clans, may 2016

Cavite comes second on the list of provinces with the highest number of voters with 1,843,163 or three percent of the country’s voting population. It is one of the least-poor province with only 4.1-percent poverty incidence rate in 2012.

Since 1992, the Cavitenos have elected a total of 504 local officials. A quarter or 127 of them ran under the Lakas party, whereas 120 were affiliated with the Partido Magdalo (PM), a provincial party founded and built by the province’s longest running governor, Juanito Remulla. PM allied itself with the LDP in 1992 and 2004, Estrada’s Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (LAMMP) in 1998 when he ran for president, and Lakas party in 2013. A significant number of its elected officials were members of NP.

LP, meanwhile, has garnered 91 electoral victories in Cavite so far, 78 of which were attained in the last three elections, from 2007 to 2013. Most of these were victories of members of the Abaya, Arayata, Loyola, Aguinaldo, Maliksi, Tolentino, and Campaña families who were elected at least three times each in the last eight elections.

These families are part of the 13 different clans that have a minimum of eight electoral victories each in the province. Over a quarter or 132 of Cavite’s total elected officials belong to these clans. The Arayatas and Remullas topped the Comelec list of candidates with each having 14 electoral posts in the last two decades. The Arayatas dominated the politics of the town of Tanza, whereas “Remulla” was a regular name in the second and third congressional districts as well as gubernatorial races.

Next are the Tolentinos with 13 winning candidates in Tagaytay City’s local polls. The Maliksis and Aguinaldos had 11 each in Imus City and the town of Kawit, respectively. Apart from national positions, members of the Revilla family won 10 electoral posts in the second congressional district, Bacoor City, and the province’s vice gubernatorial races. (The “Revillas” are actually Bautistas. “Revilla” is the screen surname used by members of the clan who are active in showbiz, who include Cavite 2nd District Rep. Lani Mercado, wife of Senator Ramon ‘Bong’ Revilla Jr. Mercado, whose real name is Jesusa H. Bautista, is running for mayor of Bacoor.)

The Barzagas (in the second and fourth districts and Dasmarinas City), Ferrers (in the sixth district and the town of General Trias), and Loyolas (in the fifth district and the town of Carmona) follow with nine electoral wins. Then come the Abayas in the first district, Campañas in the town of General Trias, Nazarenos in the town of Naic, and del Rosarios in the town of Tanza had eight wins each.

In 2013, 10 of these 13 families were affiliated with the LP. Only the Remullas, Revillas, and Nazarenos remained staunchly with the opposition.

The Lakas party of Bong Revilla, who claimed to have been detained since 2014 on plunder and graft charges because of his plan to run for the 2016 presidential race, endorsed the vice presidential candidacy of Marcos. The party, however, failed to reach a consensus on who to endorse in the presidential race. Thus, members are split among Binay, Duterte, and Poe. The Revillas alone are supporting Poe.

Among the 10 recurring family names in the Cavite political scene, the Abayas were the longest members of LP, having been affiliated with the party since 2001. The Arayatas, Aguinaldos, Campañas, del Rosarios, and Maliksis used to be members of LDP and PM, but they became LP converts in 2007. The Tolentinos and Loyolas had run under the Lakas Party, and then switched to LP in 2010. In 2013, the Barzagas and Ferrers joined the National Unity Party (NUP), which was part of the LP-led coalition.

Aquino appointed Francis N. Tolentino as head of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) in 2010, and Joseph Emilio Abaya as secretary of Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) in 2012. Tolentino is seeking a Senate seat in the 2016 elections and declared his support for Duterte’s presidential bid. He is not running under the banner of the LP, but his brother is.

THE CLANS OF PANGASINAN

PCIJ.Pangasinan Top clans, may 2016

Pangasinan is home to the third largest voting population of 1,705,260 and makes up half of Ilocos region’s population. It is among the richest provinces in 2014 with a P4.23-billion equity, which compares with that of highly urbanized cities of Marikina, Calamba in Laguna, and Cagayan de Oro in Misamis Oriental.

Since 1992, nearly half or 426 of Pangasinan’s 922 elected officials, excluding city/municipal councilors, were affiliated with the Lakas party. Others ran under the NPC and its allies (211), the LDP (63), LP (40), LAMMP (23), Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma or REPORMA (15), Estrada’s Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino or PMP (7), and UNA (4). Many, too, were independent candidates (53).

All 14 prominent families that have dominated Pangasinense politics have been affiliated with the Lakas party and NPC of Cojuangco, a Pangasinense political kingpin whose wife belongs to the Oppen political family of Negros Occidental. Among the 14 clans are the Perezes with 22 electoral victories, the Celestes with 19, the Espinos and Reyeses with 17 each, the Sorianos with 15, the Villars with 14, the Resuellos and de Veras with 12 each, the Calimlims, Rosetes, and de Guzmans with 11 each, and the Agbayanis and Peraltas with 10 each.

The Perezes turn up frequently on Comelec’s list of candidates in Pangasinan’s Urdaneta City and the town of San Manuel, as well as in its fifth congressional district, where they fight for dominance against the Cojuangcos. The Celeste family name often shows up in Bolinao’s political scene; the Espinos, in the second district, gubernatorial races, and the town of Bautista; the Reyeses, in the towns of Mabini and San Quintin; the Resuellos, in San Carlos City; and Calimlims, in the town of Mapandan.

In the 2016 elections, the Espinos and Calimlims of the Aksyon Demokratiko (Aksyon) declared their support for Roxas. Their former ally, former Pangasinan fifth district Congressman Mark Cojuangco, has pledged support for Roxas’s rival, Binay, defying his father’s and NPC’s decision to endorse Poe. Both Espinos and Cojuangcos, however, are supporting the vice presidential bid of Marcos. Meanwhile, the Perezes, Peraltas, and Celestes are allied with the NPC, but it remains unclear whose candidacy they support.

THE CLANS OF LAGUNA

PCIJ. Laguna Top clans, may 2016

Laguna is fourth on the list of provinces with the most number of registered voters with 1,675,366 voters. Laguna’s economy is a mix of industrial, largely boosted by nearby Metro Manila, and agricultural activities in distant areas.

Laguna’s 608 elected officials from 1992 to 2013 were also a mix of several family names affiliated with national political parties such as the Lakas Party (227), LDP (103), LP (49), UNA (40), NPC (39), and NP (28), among others. In 2013, 29 of Laguna’s elected officials ran under the UNA banner; 23 were with the LP; and 17, with the NP.

Only six clans had at least eight electoral victories each in Laguna: The Chipecos won 11 times in total in the second congressional district and Calamba City’s mayoral seats. The Perezes were elected eight times as mayor of the cities of Los Banos and Binan. Eight electoral victories were also enjoyed by the San Luises in the fourth congressional district, provincial seats, and the town of Santa Cruz; the Buesers in the third district and the city of San Pablo and town of Alaminos; the Ramoses in the town of Bay; and the Sanchezes in Calauan City and town of Pakil.

The Ejercito clan, which traces its roots in Laguna, had a total of seven electoral victories in the town of Pagsanjan and gubernatorial positions. Other members of the clan dominate the politics of San Juan City in Metro Manila, where former ousted President and now Manila Mayor Joseph Estrada began his political career. Estrada is endorsing the candidacy of Poe, daughter of his long-time friend, the movie king Fernando Poe. Jr. The latter also ran for president in 2004 but lost.

THE CLANS OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

PCIJ. Negros Occidental Top Clans, may 2016

Negros Occidental, the country’s major sugar producer, is the fifth most vote-rich province with 1,663,492 registered voters. Both presidential aspirants Roxas and Poe have significant ties to the province. Roxas traces his maternal roots in Bago City, while Poe’s adoptive mother hails from Bacolod City.

For years, several of the province’s 674 elected officials were members of the NPC and the former ruling Lakas party. A third or more of the 83 to 85 local officials belong to either of these two parties. In 2013, however, several of them joined the LP and supported the LP-led coalition. NPC also allied with the LP at the time.

News reports have quoted local NPC members as saying that the NPC national leadership have allowed them to choose who to support in the 2016 presidential candidates, although the NPC has declared that it is backing Poe’s presidential candidacy.

The Marañons, Ferrers, Escalantes, and Zaycos are among the province’s prominent families that have shown support for Roxas’s presidential bid in 2016. The Maranñons dominate the second congressional district and Sagay City as well as the gubernatorial races in the last two decades with 19 electoral victories. The Ferrers are powerful in the fourth district and in La Carlota City. The Escalantes, meanwhile, reign in the city of Cadiz and town of Manapala, and were elected 13 times. The Zaycos obtained 14 electoral posts in Kabankalan City’s 24 years of election.

Nine other families frequently pop up in Comelec’s list of candidates in Negros Occidental. They are the Lacsons who have won 25 electoral posts in the province’s third congressional district and gubernatorial races as well as in San Carlos City and the towns of Murcia and Enrique B. Magalona. Other families include the Alvarezes in the sixth district and town of Ilog with 17 electoral wins; the Yulos in the fifth district, Bago City, and town of Binalbagan with 15 wins; the Lizareses in Talisay City, Palancas in Victorias City, and Toreses in Bago City with 11 wins each; and the Montillas in Sipalay City and Garcias in the town of Moises Padilla with 10 wins each.

THE CLANS OF DAVAO DEL SUR

PCIJ. Davao del Sur Top clans, may 2016

Davao del Sur down south ranks as the 12th most vote-rich province in the Philippines and the first in Mindanao region with 1,247,362 voters. Its center, Davao City, is Duterte’s bailiwick where he has served as an elected official for more than two decades. Members of the Duterte clan have chalked up a total of 11 electoral victories from 1992 to 2013.

Since 2010, the Dutertes had run under the LP, which has fielded Roxas for the 2016 presidential race. Duterte at first had resisted calls for him to run for president. When he finally decided in December 2015 to enter the race, he obtained support from PDP-Laban and former Senator Manuel B. Villar’s NP. No political clan in Davao del Sur was affiliated with the PDP-Laban in 2013, but two of the province’s nine enduring political clans, which won at least 10 electoral posts in the last eight elections, ran under the NP.

The Cagases, who dominate the province’s first congressional district and won twice in the gubernatorial races, used to be with the Lakas party; they had been with the NP since 2010. The Mariscals of the town of Santa Maria were affiliated with the Lakas party from 1992 to 1998, and with the NPC from 2001 to 2010. They became NP converts in 2013.

Two other political clans were affiliated with the LP in 2013. The Bautistas of the province’s second congressional district and town of Malita ran under the NPC and Lakas from 1992 to 2010. In 2013, they shifted alliance to the LP. The Garcias, which remained unseated in the first congressional district of Davao City, were affiliated with the NPC in 1992 and from 2001 to 2010; they joined the LP in 2013.

Another two of the nine ran under the NPC in 2013. The Lopezes, which won 14 electoral posts in the third congressional district of Davao City and town of Santa Cruz, have frequently changed affiliations from the PMP to the Lakas party, and then to the NPC in 2013. The Latasas of Digos City had been with the NPC since 1992. The Colinas ran under the Lakas party from 1992 to 1998, and then shifted alliance to NPC from 2001 to 2007. They returned to the Lakas party in 2010, and then moved again to NPC in 2013.

Only the Camineros of the town Kiblawan, who were previously affiliated with the Lakas party and NPC, joined Binay’s UNA in 2013.— PCIJ, May 2016
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For details, check out PCIJ’s Money Politics Online

101 political clans rule polls in top 20 vote-rich provinces

mcmangahas

By Rowena F. Caronan
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism

PCIJ Top Clans pol parties, may 2016

THROUGHOUT THE 24 years of elections in the Philippines’s 20 provinces with the most number of registered voters, family names on the ballots seem to keep repeating themselves, the same ones popping up over and over again. It’s a situation that goes against the equal access to opportunities for public service guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution. Then again, the Charter also talks about prohibiting political dynasties “as may be defined by law,” but just look where we are now.

Based on the list of candidates from the 1992 to 2013 elections from the Commission on Elections (Comelec), about 10,000 persons had repeatedly occupied 17,673 elective posts in six of the nation’s 20 vote-rich provinces. They have held positions of power from the local level to the halls of Congress simply by belonging to political clans that have continued to hold sway over communities large and small across the country for the last quarter of a century.

Various members of these political clans that litter Comelec’s list often take the same positions again and again. Members of a clan are also usually elected all at the same time for different posts. It is also not uncommon to see members of the same family fighting against each other in an electoral race.

A few members of these families have even found their way to a political career through barangay elections, or turned to barangay positions after failed local bids. This has been a common practice, despite barangay officials supposedly being non-partisan in nature. A number of them have also managed to install their members to national positions, including the highest one that enabled their family to wield power from within the Palace along the Pasig River.

PCIJ analyzed Comelec’s data on the list of candidates in six of the 20 vote-rich provinces from the 1992 elections. These six have a combined voters’ strength of 10.86 million or 20 percent of the latest count of total registered voters of 55.7 million.

The Comelec data showed at least 101 different family names that are each tied to at least eight electoral successes in the last eight elections, excluding the town council seats. These family names are shared and carried by as many as 1,159 elected officials.

The top 10 most recurring family names in the Comelec’s list of candidates, or those that have more than four members who won their electoral contests and have at least 17 electoral victories over the last eight elections, include the following:

• Durano, Garcia, Martinez, and Yapha in Cebu in central Visayas, which is home to five percent of the country’s voting population and has an economy trailing that of Metro Manila;
• Celeste, Espino, and Perez in Pangasinan in northern Luzon, which is the richest province in Ilocos region;
• Alvarez, Lacson, and Maranon in Negros Occidental in the newly created Negros Island region with the highly urbanized city of Bacolod as the center; and
• Bautista in Davao del Sur in the southeastern part of Mindanao.

PCIJ.Cebu pol parties, may 2016

Duranos top ’em all

Among the six provinces, the Duranos emerged as having the most electoral wins: 57 from the 1992 to 2013 polls. The Duranos were followed by the Lacson family with 25, the Bautistas and Perezes with 22, the Martinezes with 20; the Celestes and Maranons with 19; the Garcias with 18; and the Alvarezes, Espinos, and Yaphas with 17.

An average of seven Durano members has simultaneously won at the congressional and provincial elections as well as in Danao City and the towns of Samboan and Sogod.

In the 2013 elections, 10 Duranos won their electoral contests. Thus far, this is the highest number a political clan in Cebu has achieved in a single poll in the last two decades. Such number could be next to the record set by the Ampatuans of Mindanao who enjoyed at least 15 electoral victories in 2013 despite being implicated in the country’s worst electoral violence yet in 2009.

Danao City and the rest of Cebu’s fifth congressional district have remained the Durano’s family territory in which they have held onto their seats consistently for 24 years. The fifth district is home to 12 percent of Cebu’s voters. Danao City is a third-class city, but ranks sixth based on the number voters among Cebu’s 53 cities and municipalities.

Ramon ‘Nito’ Durano III and his sons Joseph Felix Mari or Ace and Ramon VI or Red have taken turns sitting in Congress since 1992. Ace is the incumbent congressman of Cebu’s 5th District, while Nito is currently serving as mayor of Danao City. The mayoral seat was previously held by Nito’s brother Jesus and nephew Ramon IV.

Nito’s other siblings and their children are also in politics, including Beatriz, Thaddeus, Ramon Jr., and Rose Marie. Rose Marie and Beatriz married into significant political clans in the northern and southern Cebu towns. Rose Marie’s husband, Celestino Sybico, hails from Balamban; Beatriz’s spouse Emerito Calderon is from Samboan. Vicente T. Pimentel Jr., brother-in-law of Nito’s wife, is also a politician from Carrascal, Surigao del Sur. The Duranos’ third-generation politicians who appeared frequently as well on Comelec’s list are Beatriz’s sons Raymond Joseph and Emerito Jr. Calderon; Lydia’s son Oscar D. Rodriguez Jr.; Thaddeus’s daughter Lissa Marie D. Streegan; Ramon Jr.’s son Ramon IV; Nito’s children Ace, Red, Thomas Mark, and Carmen Remedios D. Meca; Jesus’s son Ramon V; and Rose Marie’s son Jude Thaddeus Sybico. The Duranos are cousins to Cebu Vice Governor Agnes Magpale, who is also related to the Almendrases of Cebu.

PCIJ Negros Occidental pol parties, may 2016

With 25 electoral wins, the Lacsons of Negros Occidental are next to the Duranos in the highest number of electoral victories over the last 24 years. Four incumbent officials belong to the Lacson clan, including Jose Carlos Lacson, Andrew Montelibano, Eugenio Jose Lacson, and Ernest Lacson Jr. They have been elected in the province’s third congressional district and in the local offices of San Carlos City and the town of Murcia. San Carlos City is a second-class city, whereas Murcia is a first-class municipality.

Bautistas, Perezes next

The Bautistas of Davao del Sur and Perezes of Pangasinan come next with 22 electoral victories each.

Five Bautistas occupy various posts in the second district of Davao del Sur, as well as the mayoral seat of Malita town. Malita, a first-class municipality, is now the capital of newly created province of Davao Occidental. The Bautistas were also present at the provincial level with two members of the clan both once elected as governor. One of the two was also elected as vice governor, the other as member of the provincial council.

Benjamin Bautista Sr. is the late clan patriarch. He was Malita mayor in the 1960s and served as Davao del Sur 2nd District representative from 1987 to 1998. His son Franklin took over his seat in Congress, occupying it from 1998 to 2001 and then from 2007 to 2013. Franklin also replaced Benjamin as Malita mayor from 1992 to 1998 and 2001 to 2007. Another of Benjamin’s sons, Claude, entered politics in 1995 and was elected as member of the provincial council. Claude replaced his brother as Malita mayor in 1998 and as congressman in 2001 and 2004. Claude became the second Bautista to be elected governor in 2013.

PCIJ Davao del Sur pol parties, may 2016

Meanwhile, the Comelec data yielded two Perez families in Pangasinan. One family includes brothers Amadeo Jr. and Eduardo; Amadeo’s son, Amadeo Gregorio IV and Jose Angelo; and nephew Antonino and niece Rosary Gracia P. del Val. These Perezes have actively participated in Urdaneta City’s local politics since 1992, serving in Pangasinan’s fifth congressional district and Urdaneta City’s mayoral office. Urdaneta, a second-class city, is third in most number of voters among Pangasinan’s 48 towns.

In 2010, Eduardo ran in the barangay elections when he lost his bid for a seat in the council. Two of Amadeo’s sons also began their political careers as barangay captains. Amadeo Gregorio IV was the president of the Association of Barangay Captains and Jose Angelo, head of Barangay Anonas. Amadeo Gregorio IV later replaced his father as mayor.

The second set of Perezes rules the town of San Manuel, a first-class municipality that has a voting population that is only a third of Urdaneta City’s. This family has as politicians Salvador and his three children Alain Jerico, Salvador Jr., and Sheila Marie; and Salvador’s nephew, Pancho Jr.

PCIJ. Pangasinan pol parties, may 2016

The family has remained unseated in the mayoral seat of San Manuel since 1992, except from 1998 to 2001. Salvador served as mayor from 1992 to 1998 and 2001 to 2010. His brother Pancho had taken a shot at being mayor in 1998, but lost in the polls. He is succeeded in 2010 by his son Alain Jerico, who held the vice mayoral seat from 2007 to 2010. Then Salvador also assumed his son’s vice mayoral seat from 2010 to present. Other members of the family were elected as councilors, including Salvador Jr. (2010 to 2013) and Sheila and Pancho Jr. (2013 to 2016.)

Martinezes, Celestes, Marañons

The Martinezes of Cebu, meanwhile, have had 20 electoral victories from 1992 to 2013. At least six Martinezes have been elected into office, representing Cebu’s 4th District from 1992 to 2007 and occupying the mayoral offices of Bogo City and the town of San Remigio from 2001 to present. Bogo city is a sixth-class city, whereas San Remigio is a third-class town.

Among the Martinezes is Celestino Jr. who served in Congress from 1992 to 1998 and as Bogo City mayor from 2007 to present. His wife Clavel took over his seat in Congress from 1998 to 2007, and their son Celestino III served as mayor of Bogo City from 2001 to 2007.

Next with 19 electoral victories each are the Celestes of Pangasinan and Marañons of Negros Occidental.

Eight members of the Celeste family have served in Congress and in the local offices of the fourth-class city of Alaminos and the first-class municipality of Bolinao. Bolinao’s mayoral seat has been held consecutively by siblings Jesus, Alfonso, and Arnold since 1995. Jesus served from 1995 to 2001; Alfonso, from 2001 to 2010; and Arnold, from 2013 to 2016.

Jesus was elected in 2010 and 2013 as congressman in Pangasinan’s first district, replacing his brother Arthur, who held the same position from 2001 to 2010. In 2013, Arthur was elected mayor of Alaminos City. Another sibling George served as Bolinao councilor from 1998 to 2007 and 2010 to present. A cousin, also named George, is currently in his last term as councilor.

At the barangay level, another Celeste cousin Romeo was barangay captain of Barangay Germinal in Bolinao from 2010 to 2013. Arthur’s daughter Kazel was president of Sangguniang Kabataan Provincial Federation from 2007 to 2010.

PCIJ.Laguna pol parties, may 2016
The Marañons, for their part, dominated the politics of Negros Occidental’s second district and the third- class city of Sagay. Members of the clan were also elected four times as governor of the province.

In 1992, Joseph Marañon was elected mayor of Sagay City. He was re-elected in 1995 and 1998 before he secured the gubernatorial seat in 2001; he held to the provincial post for three terms. His brother Alfredo was congressman from 1995 to 2004, Sagay City mayor from 2007 to 2010, and governor from 2010 to 2013.

Alfredo III replaced his father Alfredo in Congress and served from 2004 to 2010. He also assumed the mayoral seat in 2010; he was elected for a second term in 2013. A nephew, Leo Rafael Cueva, took over as Negros Occidental 2nd District Representative in 2013.

Garcias, Yaphas, Alvarezes

Then there are the Garcias of Cebu, with 18 electoral victories. Leading the Garcia clan is patriarch Pablo Sr., who served as Cebu’s three-term governor from 1995 to 2004. He was also congressman in the province’s third district from 1987 to 1995 and in the second district from 2007 to 2013. His daughter Gwendolyn or Gwen succeeded him in the provincial capitol and completed her third consecutive three-year term in 2013. Gwendolyn then assumed the congressional seat her brother, Pablo John, held from 2007 to 2013 in the third district. Pablo Sr.’s other sons, Marlon and Nelson Gamaliel, took local posts in the towns of Barili and Dumanjug, where they served, respectively, as vice mayor and mayor. Winston, another of Pablo’s sons, was Cebu provincial board member from 1992 to 1995.

Last on the top 10 list of families with the most electoral wins are the Alvarezes, Espinos, and Yaphas, all of whom have 17 electoral victories each.

The Yaphas of Cebu rule the province’s third district and second-class town of Pinamungahan. The family consists of Antonio Jr., his wife Estrella, and children, Geraldine and Jeffrey. At present, however, only Antonio Jr. is in public office, serving as vice mayor of Toledo City.

In Negros Occidental are five elected Alvarezes, including Genaro Jr., his wife Mercedes, sons Genaro Rafael III and John Paul, and daughter-in-law Joyce. The family has simultaneously held electoral posts in the province’s sixth congressional district and the second-class town of Ilog. Genaro Jr. was provincial board member from 1992 to 1995. He served in Congress from 1995 to 2004 and 2007 to 2010. He then won the vice gubernatorial race in the 2010 elections. He was succeeded by his son Genaro Rafael III in Congress from 2004 to 2007, and by his wife from 2010 to present. Another son, John Paul, was Ilog’s mayor from 1998 to 2007 and from 2010 to 2013. John Paul’s wife Joyce took over the mayoral seat from 2007 to 2013.

PCIJ.Cavite pol parties, may 2016

In Pangasinan, the Espino name comes up frequently in the politics of the province’s second district and poor town of Bautista.

The political Espinos include siblings Amado Jr., Amadeo, and Jose. Amado Jr.’s sons, Amado III and Jumel Anthony, and Jose’s son Joseph. Nephews Armando and Joshua and niece Nerissa are also politicians. The family has remained firmly on the mayoral seat of Bautista town since 1995, the post occupied first by Jose and then Amado III. Amadeo took over the position later. –– PCIJ, May 2016
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