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4 out of 10 Pinoys want PNoy to stay

March 19, 2015March 19, 2015 Julius Mariveles Leave a comment

But buck passage of BBL

By Julius D. Mariveles

President Benigno S. Aquino III presents the Operational Controlled Unit Officer of the Year Award to Maj. Lourdes Imperial during the 29th Founding Anniversary of the Presidential Security Group (PSG) at the PSG Grandstand, Malacañang Park in Manila City on Tuesday (March 10, 2015). This year’s celebration has for its theme: “Kalasag ng Pangulo: Kaagapay Tungo sa Pag-Unlad at Malawakang Pagbabago.” The PSG is the lead agency tasked in providing security to the President of the Philippines and the First Family, as well as visiting Heads of States and diplomats. (Photo by Gil Nartea / Malacañang Photo Bureau)

EVEN if they are not satisfied with his explanation on why the Mamasapano operation failed, most Filipinos want President Benigno S. Aquino III to stay in office amid calls by some sectors for his resignation following the botched operation that killed 44 members of the police Special Action Force (SAF), 18 members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and five civilians.

In the latest Pulse Asia Ulat ng Bayan survey, 42 percent of the respondents disagreed that Aquino “should resign as President of the Philippines now.” Only 29 percent agreed that he should resign. However, majority of those surveyed – eight out of 10— also think that President Aquino’s explanation on the Mamasapano operation is not enough and that he should have attended the arrival honors for the fallen SAF troopers at the Villamor Airbase on January 29, 2015.

SOURCE: Pulse Asia

Too, 44 percent of the survey respondents said they don’t want Congress to pass the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), a top priority legislation of the Aquino administration. Only 21 percent agreed that Congress should pass it while the remaining 36 percent were undecided. The proposed BBL would provide the framework for self-governance in the country’s Muslim south after a final peace agreement was signed between the Philippine government and the separatist MILF last year.

SOURCE: Pulse Asia

The survey also revealed that a great majority of Filipinos have heard, read or watched something about the BBL (88 percent) and virtually every Filipino knows about the Mamasapano incident (99 percent). Nine out of 10 Filipinos knew that Aquino failed to attend the January 29 arrival honors for the slain SAF troopers.

Ironically, more people in Mindanao are opposed to the passage of the BBL (62 percent), followed by those in the National Capital Region (52 percent), the Visayas (43 percent), and the rest of Luzon (32 percent). Sentiments for the passage of the BBL, on the other hand, was strongest in the balance of Luzon at 25 percent.

SOURCE: Pulse Asia

Opposition against the passage of the BBL was highest among the poor – economic Classes D and E – at 45 and 43 percent, respectively, with only 37 percent expressing opposition in Classes ABC.

Meanwhile, most people in the NCR (45 percent) and the rest of Luzon (47 percent) are opposed to the call for President Aquino’s resignation while only 39 percent of the people in Mindanao and 34 percent in the Visayas have the same sentiment.

SOURCE: Pulse Asia

The Mamasapano operation and related developments dominated the news headlines before and during the face-to-face interviews conducted by Pulse Asia from March 1 – 7, 2015.

These included:

The declaration by President Benigno S. Aquino III of 30 January 2015 as National Day of Mourning for the fallen officers;
The President’s absence during the arrival honors for the 42 of the 44 fallen policemen whose bodies arrived at the Villamor Air Base from Maguindanao on 29 January;
President Aquino’s conferment of the Medalya ng Katapangan upon the 44 slain PNP-SAF policemen during the necrological services held as part of the National Day of Mourning;
The conduct of several investigations to shed light on what really transpired in Mamasapano and who should be held accountable for the death of the 44 policemen;
A proposal for the creation of a still another body – an independent truth commission – to conduct a probe into the incident;
Amidst the unresolved questions surrounding the Mamasapano incident, calls for the resignation of President Aquino by several senior bishops belonging to the National Transformation Council (NTC), student groups and other militant organizations;
The statement by the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) that it is not supportive of such calls even as it favors the creation of a truth commission; and
The expression by several business groups of their continued support for President Aquino and his administration’s peace initiatives in Mindanao despite the events in Mamasapano.

Other developments during this period that are connected to the Mamasapano encounter were:

The removal of PNP-SAF Commander Getulio Napeñas who was removed from his post on 27 January 2015 following the death of 44 of his men during the Mamasapano encounter;
The resignation of PNP Director General Alan Purisima on 05 February 2015 amidst reports that he was involved in the decision-making process related to the police operation in Mamasapano whilst under preventive suspension resulting from a graft and corruption charge;
Reports that disgruntled members of the country’s armed forces are planning to stage a coup against President Aquino in the aftermath of the Mamasapano incident and expressions of loyalty to the Philippine government by high ranking military and police officers who say that they still have to verify such reports; and
Military operations conducted toward the end of February 2015 by the AFP against the BIFF and the Abu Sayyaf in certain areas of Mindanao reportedly to reduce these groups’ ability to carry out violent attacks against civilians. The military offensive has resulted in casualties on both sides as well as the evacuation of thousands of civilians.

Mamasapano, once over: TOT, lowbatt, soaked radio, no signal

March 18, 2015March 18, 2015 Julius Mariveles Leave a comment

PRESIDENT Benigno S. Aquino III condoles with the family of the fallen Philippine National Police-Special Action Force (PNP-SAF) Troopers during the Necrological Service at the NCRPO Multi-Purpose Center of Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig City on Friday (January 30, 2015) | Photo by Gil Nartea / Malacañang Photo Bureau

By Julius Mariveles

ALTHOUGH POLICE Director Getulio Napeñas knew there would be fatalities in carrying out what is now revealed as ‘Oplan Exodus,’ he estimated that there would be only 10 deaths among his men.

In the end, 44 members of the Philippine National Police Special Action Force (SAF) units that were sent to accomplish the mission last January 25 in Mamasapano, Maguindanao lost their lives, along with those of 18 rebel fighters and at least five civilians.

Napeñas has since suggested that there would have been fewer deaths had the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) responded earlier to rescue the SAF troopers. But among the findings of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) formed by the PNP to look into the Mamasapano incident are two key factors that probably contributed to the delay in AFP aid.

The first is the insistence of the PNP officials who put together ‘Oplan Exodus’ to stick to “time on target” or TOT in executing the mission. In truth, resigned Police Director General Alan Purisima had mentioned the phrase several times during the Senate hearing on the tragedy, using it as an explanation why he did not inform the AFP in advance about the mission.

PRESIDENT Benigno S. Aquino III offers prayers to the remains of slain Marine Corporal Josen Mias and Sergeant Francis Jeffel Flores during the wake visit at the Fort Bonifacio Naval Station Mortuary in Taguig City on Monday afternoon (March 16, 2015). President Aquino recognized the heroism of the two marines killed in encounters with Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) in Maguindanao | Photo by Benhur Arcayan / Malacañang Photo Bureau

The BOI said the application of the concept meant that information would be disclosed only to a limited number of persons “until the target is engaged.” In this case, the targets were Zhulkifli Bin Hir alias Marwan, Ahmad Akmad Batabol Usman alias Usman, and Amin Baco alias Jihad, all of whom were on the U.S. wanted list for terrorism. Only Marwan was killed in the SAF assault; Usman and Jihad remain at large.

In theory, the report said, the TOT concept is “alien” even to the Armed Forces and is against all established standard operating procedures of the Armed Forces. Within the PNP itself, the TOT concept is applicable “only to ordinary police operations” and “does not conform to the established and acceptable operational concepts and protocols of the PNP,” the BOI said.

But when President Benigno S. Aquino III instructed Purisima and Napeñas to coordinate with the AFP, Napeñas had replied that the operation might be compromised due to “intermarriages of some AFP personnel with local people,” noted the report. Napeñas also cited previous operations of the SAF against high-value targets that failed because they coordinated with the AFP, a view shared by Purisima and Intelligence Group chief, Senior Supt. Fernando Mendez.

THE participation of resigned PNP chief Alan Purisima violated the PNP’s chain of command, the BOI report said.

According to the report, Aquino had “remained silent” when Napeñas proposed the adoption of TOT for Oplan Exodus.

The use of TOT for the mission, however, meant that the AFP could not immediately provide support like artillery or close air support to the SAF units carrying out Exodus since these would require preparations.

It is also because of the TOT concept that the ceasefire mechanisms in the peace pact between the government and MILF were activated late – hours after the fighting between the SAF and various armed groups had already started. The BOI noted that based on the experience of the AFP, it would take at least five hours for a total ceasefire to be implemented once a gunbattle starts.

Yet one of the survivors, Supt. Raymund Train of the 84th Special Action Company, the attack unit, told the BOI that they had expected indirect artillery support from the AFP in case of heavy enemy fire.

ARTILLERY support for the SAF troopers came when 44 were already dead on January 25 | Photo from Zombie Wiki

That kind of support did indeed come – in the early evening of January 25, when most of the fighting was done and 44 of Train’s comrades were already dead.

Another crucial factor that seems to have complicated the AFP’s extension of help was the apparently inadequate communication equipment used by SAF during the mission.

Indeed, while the SAF troopers were armed with expensive rifles, night-vision googles, and other high-tech equipment on a par with elite units of advanced countries, the communication equipment most had on them were two-way radios that were not designed for military use. According to the report, these were not “compatible with AFP radios for interoperability” or could not communicate on the same radio frequency.

AN EXAMPLE of a Harris radio being used by two US forces | Photo from tacrep

AN EXAMPLE of a Harris radio used by two US forces | Photo from tacrep

Worse, the radios had old batteries that could not retain power for a long period of time. “The batteries,” said the BOI, ” had poor power-retention capability due to wear and tear.” In simple terms, they went “lowbatt” quickly.

The SAF troopers used two brands of radio: the Harris Tactical Handheld Radio and the Motorola Ultra High Frequency transceivers. Only several units of the Harris radio were deployed to operators, and were used to relay information to the tactical and advanced command posts.

While the Harris radios worked, the Motorola units commonly used by policemen in urban areas constantly malfunctioned after being soaked in water. The batteries of those left functioning lasted for only several hours, the report said.

Such was the lack of communication among the SAF troopers battling it out with hundreds of armed men that they had to rely on gunfire to determine each other’s locations.

And as the operation unfolded, short-message service or text via cellular phones became the main mode of communication. But, said the BOI, texting “fell short of what were needed to relay real-time information and coordination of activities to and from the chain of command.”

It said that based on standard practice in conducting military operations “communications conducted through text messages do not connote urgency to respond or react.” The act of typing a text message alone indicates “that the sender has enough time to construct the message and wait for the recipient to reply at his available time,” said the report.

Yet there was Purisima sending a text message to Lt. Gen. Rustico Guerrero at around 7:57 a.m. of January 25, during what the BOI report said was the “crucial stage of the crisis: “Baka pwede artillery support sa AFP (Maybe the AFP can provide artillery support).”

Guerrero, also through texting, had earlier told Purisima that “tank and artillery support are made available” but were not yet necessarily deployed for the pinned down SAF troopers. Still, the BOI said, “Even if the response was ambiguous, (Purisima) failed to clarify its deployment by, for example, calling Guerrero.”

The report also mentioned that Napeñas tried texting Purisima several times to update him about the situation on the ground but because of poor network signal, some of his messages could not be sent.

Police Officer 3 Lloyd Tano Ensoy, one of the radio operators who bridged the communication between the 55th Special Action Company and the Tactical Command Post, also told the BOI that at around 1:00 p.m. of January 25, Napeñas himself heard Senior Insp. John Garry Erana shouting over the radio:”Mauubos na kami dito! (We are about to be all killed here!)”
That last message was followed by radio silence.

At around 1:26 p.m., said the report, Napeñas texted PNP Officer in Charge Leonardo Espina. Napeñas’s message was that the SAF had only wounded personnel. – PCIJ, March 2015

Poe to Aquino: Be a leader, tell the truth

March 18, 2015March 18, 2015 Ellen Leave a comment

Sen. Grace Poe reveals findings of Senate committee that investigated Mamasapano tragedy.

Reading President Aquino’s speech before the 2015 graduates of the Philippine Military Academy last Sunday, I got the impression that he is isolated from the real world outside Malacañang.

For how does one who has to suffer daily the monstrous Metro Manila traffic and the inefficiency of the MRT accept his painting of the country as a paradise and taking credit for this “accomplishment”: “At hindi naman sa pagbubuhat ng bangko, pero ngayon pa lang, masasabi nating higit na maganda ang kalagayan ng bansa kumpara sa ating dinatnan. Nilinis natin ang burukrasya, tinugis ang mga tiwali, pinasigla ang ekonomiya, at nagbukas tayo ng mga bagong pinto ng oportunidad para sa ating mga kababayan. (Not to be self-indulgent, but at this stage, we can truly say that our country’s situation is much better than we found it. We cleaned up the bureaucracy, pursued the corrupt, revitalized the economy, and opened new doors of opportunity for our countrymen.)”

Lawyer Vic Fornier was so pissed off, he commented in Facebook: “Mabagsakan siya sana ng bangko sa ulo niyang panot.(I wish the bench would fall on his bald head.) ”

President Aquino delivers speech at the 110th PMA commencement exercises.

Aquino slammed those who don’t believe that the Philippines is a paradise as playing deaf and blind. “Mga nagbubulag-bulagan at nagbibingi-bingihan lang ang hindi nakakaramdam sa malaking pagbabagong tinatamasa ng ating bayan. (Only those playing deaf and blind are those who have not felt the massive transformation our country is experiencing),” he said.

More than a third of the people in this country then is playing deaf and blind because the latest nationwide survey of Pulse Asia, conducted last week (March 1 to 7), showed that only 38 percent of Filipinos approved of what Aquino is doing, a huge 21 percent drop from the 59 percent approval rating he enjoyed November last year.

The survey was done more than a month after the Jan. 25 Mamasapano tragedy happened where 67 people were killed including 44 members of the Philippine National Police’s Special Action Force, 18 members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and five civilians including an eight-year old girl.

Malacañang earlier scored the report of the Board of Inquiry which the Philippine National Police created to investigate the Mamasapano tragedy for concluding that the President violated the chain-of-command while supervising Oplan Exodus.

Aquino’s approval rating plunges

The number of those who trust him also decreased from 56 percent last year to 36 percent this year.
“The Chain of Command in the PNP was violated. The President, the suspended CPNP Purisima and the former Director SAF Napeñas kept the information to themselves and deliberately failed to inform the OIC PNP and the SILG. The Chain of Command should be observed in running mission operations, “the BOI, headed by Police Director Benjamin Magalong, stated.

Presidential Spokesperson Edwin Lacierda disagreed saying that there was no violation of the chain of command because the PNP is a civilian organization and as Chief Executive, Aquino exercises full and absolute control over every official in the organization.

Unfortunately for Aquino, the Senate Committee on Public Order headed by Sen. Grace Poe, which conducted hearings on the tragedy, believes Aquino should be held accountable for the “massacre.”
Here’s the Grace Poe committee’s damning report:

Aquino’s trust ratings sinks

“The President must bear responsibility for giving assent to and failing to prevent the unlawful
exercise of official functions by PDGPurisima in connection with Oplan Exodus.
It is beyond doubt that the President was fully aware that PDG Purisima was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman on 4 December 2014, and that PDDG Espina was designated Officer-in-Charge of the PNP on 12 December 2014. Yet, the President: 1.Allowed PDG Purisima to join the 9 January 2015 meeting at the Bahay Pangarap, where a sensitive and classified PNP operation was being discussed; 2.Instructed PDG Purisima to coordinate Oplan Exodus with the AFP; 3. Communicated exclusively with PDG Purisima in regard the progress of Oplan Exodus on25 January 2015; and 4. Gave instructions to PDG Purisima as to the conduct of Oplan Exodus on 25 January 2015, as when the President sent PDG Purisima a text message reading, “Basit should not get away.”

Poe challenged Aquino to show leadership.

The committee report said: “At this crucial time, it is imperative that the President display unquestionable leadership, be forth right and candid with our people, accept responsibility for all decisions he makes as President, and admit the mistakes he made along the way.”

Backstory: Top cops gone awry

March 12, 2015March 12, 2015 mcmangahas Leave a comment

By Rowena F. Caronan

FINGERS ARE crossed that whoever becomes the next Director General of the Philippine National Police (PNP) would not also become a magnet of controversies like many of his predecessors.

In fact, of the four PNP heads who have served under President Benigno S. Aquino III, only one – Nicanor A. Bartolome – managed to bow out of service scandal-free. The rest somehow became entangled in controversies that rocked their leadership of an institution tasked to enforce the law and maintain peace and order.

PNP’s most recent chief, Alan L.M. Purisima, resigned last February 6 amid the investigation on the Mamasapano incident.

Purisima had the longest tenure as PNP director general post under Aquino, a distinction that is likely to remain until Aquino’s own term as President ends. Purisima’s more than two years as PNP chief, however, has been marred with numerous controversies – starting with his appointment on December 18, 2012.

His immediate predecessor, Bartolome, had been asked to relinquish his post three months ahead of his mandatory retirement on March 16, 2013. The reason for Bartolome’s early retirement, Malacañang said, was to have a smooth transition of the tasks of the PNP head to whoever was appointed and for preparations for the May 2013 elections to proceed without hitches. After all, the election ban on appointments would begin March 29, 2013 – too close to Bartolome’s mandatory retirement date.

Bartolome had initially planned to go on “non-duty” status before end-2012 while holding on to his four-star rank until March to obtain full retirement benefits. The four-star rank, however, is the highest title in PNP and held by only one police official. This meant that until Bartolome retired, his replacement, Purisima, would remain a three-star official and on the same rank as some of his subordinates.

Both Bartolome and Purisima are known long-time shooting buddies of President Aquino. During the term of the President’s mother, Cory Aquino, Bartolome and Purisima had been members of the Presidential Security Group assigned to protect the Aquino family.

Bartolome eventually agreed to early retirement, enabling Purisima to obtain the highest rank in the PNP upon his installation into office. Following his appointment, Purisima promised to walk the path of Aquino’s “Daang Matuwid,” saying his administration would not tolerate erring and corrupt police officers.

He spelled out his plans for the PNP through a program called “CODE-P: 2013,” which stood for competence, organizational development, discipline, excellence and professionalism. He continued the Individual Performance Scorecard (IP Scorecard), which served as performance monitoring and evaluation mechanism that became the basis for sanctioning or rewarding a police officer. In October 2013, Purisima relieved police officers in Western Visayas and Central Luzon for alleged inaccurate reporting of crime statistics in their jurisdiction. He also relieved the police officers involved in the rubout in Antimonan, Quezon in December of the same year.

Since March 2014, however, it has been downhill for Purisima. The first blows were graft and plunder complaints about a multi-million-peso contract that the PNP signed with the Werfast Documentation Agency Inc. to deliver gun permits. Werfast was allegedly charging overpriced and substandard service. According to the complainant, Werfast was not in the Department of Transportation and Communication’s (DOTC’s) list of authorized courier service; moreover, the company allegedly secured its certificate of incorporation only three months after the deal had been made in May 2011.

News reports later quoted Purisima as admitting that the contract did not undergo a public bidding since the PNP would not pay for the courier fees. By December 2014, his involvement in the anomalous contract would become the basis for the Ombudsman to order a six-month preventive suspension on him and other police officers.

In June 2014, Purisima was also questioned for spending P25 million for the renovation of his official residence or the “White House” at Camp Crame. Indirect bribery charges were filed against him in September for supposedly accepting gifts from his Mason brothers, who donated funds that were used for the renovation. In addition, he was slapped with graft and plunder charges for his alleged untruthful declaration of the value of a multi-million-peso property in Nueva Ecija, as well as the absence in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth of a 10-hectare piece of land in Talisay, Batangas that he is said to own. Purisima has denied owning the Batangas property.

More recently, Purisima found himself at the center of the Senate investigation on the Mamasapano tragedy. He was lambasted for allegedly meddling in the operations of the PNP Special Action Force (SAF) team on January 25, 2015 in the remote Maguindanao town even while on a preventive suspension. On that day, SAF troopers had an unexpected clash or “misencounter” with members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) during a mission to capture terrorist Zulkifli bin Hir (also known as Marwan) and bomb-maker Abdul Basit Usman. The Mamasapano clash claimed the lives of 44 SAF officers, 18 MILF members, and five civilians.

In previous occasions, President Aquino, upon being questioned by the media, had repeatedly defended Purisima. But on February 6, Aquino announced on live television that he had accepted Purisima’s resignation. Purisima’s mandatory retirement, however, is on November 21, 2015 yet.

The Mamasapano tragedy is one of the two largest botched operations of the PNP under Aquino’s term. The first took place on Aug. 23, 2010, during which the apparent mishandling of police operations led to the death of eight Hong Kong nationals being held hostage by a dismissed police officer. The hostage-taker was also killed in the incident.

The hostage crisis, which earned the country international shame and infamy, involved then outgoing PNP director general Jesus A. Verzosa.

Versoza had already resigned by the time the report of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee on the hostage crisis came out in September 2010. Even while Versoza was identified as one of the culpable parties, no legal action was taken against him and other high-ranking officials, including then Interior and Local Government Undersecretary Rico E. Puno. Puno was known to be the President’s close ally.

Verzosa was named PNP chief in September 2008 by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. He remained in his post until September 2010 or about three months after Aquino took office. Yet even after his retirement, Verzosa still made headlines, along with his successor, Raul M. Bacalzo, as one of the alleged recipients of multi-million-peso monthly jueteng payola. Both denied the allegations.

Bacalzo re-implemented a one-strike policy on jueteng and illegal gambling activities immediately after his appointment in September 2010. Under the policy, PNP commanders would face relief if illegal activities remained active in their jurisdiction. Bacalzo also banned police officials from playing golf during office hours to improve the PNP’s image.

By the time his term ended in September 2011, Bacalzo had ordered the removal of the PNP logistics director and other officials as chairman and members of the Bids and Awards Committee that was involved in the anomalous procurement of choppers in 2009. His office also conducted a probe on the irregular repairs of light armored vehicles in 2007.

Bacalzo’s tenure as PNP chief, however, was marked by a rash of car thefts, bus bombings, and alleged ambushes of the National People’s Army (NPA). Yet, in a statement posted on the PNP website, the country’s crime rate supposedly decreased under Bacalzo’s leadership.

Bacalzo was Aquino’s first appointee in the PNP. Although he led the institution briefly, he is the only one so far who served until his mandatory retirement, which was on September 9, 2011.

Succeeding Bacalzo was Bartolome, who hails from the President’s ancestral hometown, Tarlac. Before his selection as PNP chief, Bartolome was popularly known as the face and mouthpiece of the organization, serving as such under several PNP director generals.

Bartolome headed the PNP for 15 months, from September 2011 to December 2012. He is remembered for securing funding for the construction of various PNP hospitals, including those built in Camp Martin Delgado in Iloilo City and Camp Rafael C. Rodriguez in Butuan City. His success in securing projects from the Department of Health, however, is credited largely to his having a wife – Dr. Noemi Bartolome – working there. – PCIJ, March 2015

The ‘lost’ guns of Mamapasano

March 10, 2015March 10, 2015 Julius Mariveles Leave a comment

By Julius D. Mariveles

THE MILITARY and police forces in the Philippines may be notorious for being perennially ill-equipped, but the same cannot be said for the Special Action Force (SAF) units of the Philippine National Police (PNP) that clashed with Moro fighters in Mamasapano, Maguindanao last January 25.

Unfortunately, having top-grade weapons were not enough to have the SAF emerge from battle with little or no fatalities. Many of the SAF’s expensive arms and military gear are also now believed to be in the hands of unfriendly forces.

Indeed, according to the list submitted by acting PNP-SAF chief, Supt. Noli Taliño, to the PNP director for logistics, the lost pieces of SAF equipment range from thousands of rounds of bullets to ceramic plates that were inserted inside tactical vests, to a variety of firearms, including machineguns.

These were “…believed to be carted away by members of the MILF during the recent encounter in Mamasapano, Maguindanao,” read the first part of the memorandum submitted by Taliño. The MILF or the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, however, has said that aside from its fighters, there were other groups in battle with the SAF troopers that day.

With a bill proposing the creation of a Bangsamoro under deliberation in Congress, the MILF and the Philippine government were and are still supposed to be observing a ceasefire. The SAF, meanwhile, were trying to carry out a mission to eliminate known terrorists Akmad Batabol Usman (also known as Basit Usman) and Zulfikli Bin Hir, alias Marwan.

The Philippine constabulary guard with shore party of Hubert A. Paton. Off the Pathfinder”, Philippines, 1926 from the Historic Coast & Geodetic Survey (C&GS) Collection. The first SAF unit was composed of grizzled veterans from the PC Long Range Patrol, a special unit created during the time of Marcos. NOAA Photo Library.

“Theb3327“. Licensed under Public Domain via Wikipedia.

Usman is Filipino and Marwan a Malaysian.

Marwan was killed in the operation while Usman, reportedly wounded, remains at large. What happened after Marwan was killed is among the points of inquiry still being explored by the board the PNP formed to look into the matter. Although it is now public knowledge that a firefight soon broke out between the SAF commandos and MILF fighters, crucial details about the operation remain unknown.

FORMER PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS was chief of the PC when the SAF was formed | Photo by Jay Directo

PNP-SAF troopers are trained for urban counter-terrorism and military operations in urban terrain or MOUT. The SAF’s missions as outlined in its official webpage include conducting operations as a rapid deployment force “anywhere in the country specifically in situations with national and international implications.”

Among its other missions are hostage rescue, commando-type unconventional warfare, search and rescue, and civil-disturbance management during national emergencies.

Formed during the latter years of the Marcos dictatorship, the SAF assumed anti-coup roles under President Corazon Aquino, whose term was rocked by coup attempts from the military. In the late 1980s, the SAF was also deployed to perform counter-insurgency roles.

In October 2003, the SAF teamed up with the Philippine military and arrested Taufik Refke, reportedly the second-highest ranking leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah in the Philippines.

The SAF was also credited for putting an end to a 2005 takeover of the Camp Bagong Diwa jail in Bicutan, Taguig City, by leaders of the Abu Sayyaf group detained there.

Among those killed were Nadzimie Sabtulah, alias Commander Global, Galib Andang, alias Commander Robot, and Alhamser Limbong, alias Commander Kosovo.

More recently, the SAF took part in operations against members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) who attacked Zamboanga City in September 2013.

SAF commandos were in the thick of the urban battle that lasted three weeks and claimed the lives of more than 20 government troopers, some 200 rebels, and at least a dozen civilians.

Two SAF companies – the 55th and the 84th – were the key units tasked to deal with Usman and Marwan in Mamasapano last January. The 84th or the Seaborne Unit had been trained by the U.S. military and was the assault force that raided Marwan’s hut.

The 55th Unit, meanwhile, was supposed to be the blocking force. Media accounts say the clash between the SAF commandos and MILF members raged for hours – from dawn to early afternoon of January 25.

By the time the sounds of gunfire ceased, at least 69 people lay dead, including eight civilians. Some 17 MILF fighters were also killed, as well as 44 SAF commandos.Most of the SAF troopers killed belonged to the 55th Unit, which had only one of its 36 members left alive.

That the SAF commandos managed to last that long could probably be traced to their stellar training, as well as to their being well-equipped.

SOME of the firearms of the slain SAF44 returned to the government through the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process | Photo by OPAPP

The latter is evident in the SAF’s “lost items” list, which is composed of 10 categories: rifles, crew-served weapons, grenade launchers, recoilless rifles, handguns, special equipment, communication equipment, ordnance, and magazines.

Of the 36 rifles that the PNP has listed as “lost”, 27 are Special Operations Assault Rifles (SOAR) produced by Ferfrans, a U.S.-based company. These rifles are chambered for the 5.56-caliber ammunition, similar to the ones being used for the M16 automatic rifle, and are designed for close-quarter combat. Of the eight other rifles, four are for sniping – two Savage Gen 2 and two Savage Gen 3 – while the four others are for assault. An assault rifle is a firearm designed to kill many people in the shortest time possible. With only one squeeze of a trigger, it can fire many bullets. Common examples of the assault rifle used by the military are the US M16 and the Russian AK-47.

Sniper rifles are more accurate guns that can destroy targets at longer ranges. Some modern sniper rifles can hit targets at a range of more than 1.6 kms.

Four crew-served weapons, commonly known as machineguns, were also declared lost. These were two M60 light machineguns and two Israeli-made Negev LMG.

AN EXAMPLE of a machinegun | Photo from wikipedia.com

Machine guns like the Negev and the M60 are called crew-served weapons because they require more than one soldier to operate. These can continue to fire at a rate of 500 to 1,000 rounds per minute as long as the trigger is squeezed. Firing faster than rifles, machine guns are best used to defend a position or to provide covering fire as troops advance on a target.

The PNP-SAF also lost 9mm-caliber handguns, eight of which are Glock 17 models, 10 Ferfrans grenade launchers, which fire the 40mm caliber cartridges as well as a 90mm recoilless rifle that is described as a type of lightweight artillery.

SOAR RIFLE with M203 | Photo from www.ferfrans.net

Missing as well are 20 hand grenades, 150 40mm ammunitions — the ones fired from an M203 — and eight 90RR ammo. (The M203 fires grenades more accurately and at longer distances compared to a grenade thrown by a soldier.)

In addition, at least 638 pistol and rifle magazines were lost, 523 of which are for M16 rifles, along with a lot of bullets – some 24,000 rounds of 5.56-caliber ball ammunition, nearly 4,000 rounds of linked 5.56, more than 5,000 rounds of 9-mm bullets, and at least 1,500 rounds of SS109 caliber 5.56 with steel penetrator tips were also lost.

The U.S. government is reportedly planning to ban the SS109, also known as “green tip” ammunition, because it can pierce a police officer’s protective vest when fired from a handgun. It is described in gun forums as designed for increased penetration in longer ranges.

AIMING LIGHT or illuminator mounted on top of a rifle | Photo from wikipedia.com

The SAF troopers had mounted PEQ 2 illuminators on their rifles, aiming lights used along with night-vision googles for operating in darkness. Twelve of these were reported lost, along with sound suppressors or silencers. The list, however, did not indicate if these were for pistols or rifles.

Ten handheld radio sets are also on the “lost” list, six with the Harris brand and four Motorolas.

Many of the SAF troopers were wearing ceramic plates inserted in their tactical vests. The list shows that while 79 of the plates were lost, only four tactical vests were declared missing by the SAF.

According to a former military officer interviewed by PCIJ, SAF troopers could have dropped their plates during the fighting.

An online check of available ceramic plates showed that it could weigh between two kgs to seven kgs. All these amount to millions of pesos.

Each of the SOAR alone costs around P118,000 based on published reports of government estimates in announcing the purchase of rifles last year.

This means the lost SOARs are worth some P3.2 million in all. The Negev machineguns cost at least P450,000 each, while a Level 4 ceramic plate could cost from $145 to $999 (P6,500 to P45,000). Level 4 is the highest protection level currently available for plates.

The government has demanded that MILF return any weapons its members got from the SAF troopers. So far, MILF has returned at least 16 firearms to the government. – With additional research by Cong B. Corrales, PCIJ, March 2015